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Abstract
William Allen, PhD. The University of Memphis. December, 2016. Liberalism and
Racial Justice in Relation to Disadvantaged African-American Communities.
Dissertation Director: Bill Lawson.

An ongoing social and political problem in America is how to bring about full
racial justice for African Americans, particularly in regards to disadvantaged AfricanAmerican communities. Given that American institutions, laws and political culture are
rooted in ideas found in liberal political philosophy, it is apropos to investigate how
liberalism addresses racial justice and whether it can serve as an effective guide towards
fully realizing African-American racial justice.
In this dissertation, I use liberal political philosophy in the tradition of J. S. Mill,
John Rawls, and classical British social contract theorists to provide insight into the
socio-political status, and obligations of disadvantaged African-American communities.
In the latter chapters I investigate whether liberalism can adequately address AfricanAmerican racial justice. First, I argue that the socio-political status of disadvantaged
African-American communities is better understood in the context of John Locke’s “state
of war” rather than Thomas Hobbes’s “state of nature.” Next, I argue that civic duties
should not be conflated with natural duties in the case of disadvantaged AfricanAmerican communities. Although such communities are not obligated to perform civic
duties as Tommie Shelby argues, they are required to perform natural duties in most
cases. In the following chapter, I argue that Rawls’s political theory is incapable of
adequately addressing corrective racial justice for African Americans, partly due to his
reliance on ideal theory. I propose the addition of a new non-ideal principle of justice
that explicitly addresses the impact of white supremacy and psychic harm in relation to
iv

African-American communities. Finally, I argue that due to traditional liberalism’s strict
commitment to autonomy and tendency to over-rely on ideal theory, it is theoretically and
practically incapable of providing a means to bring about full racial equality for African
Americans.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
While working on my doctorate for the past seven years, I have lived in two of the
top ten poorest cities in America, Memphis and Baltimore. 1 The poor in both cities are
predominately African Americans, and like in other cities with such characteristics, there
is a sizable wealth gap between blacks and whites. 2 The worst of the poor, those living in
disadvantaged communities, not only are subject to high unemployment, poverty and
crime, but subject to oppressive police practices. 3
In my first years of living in Memphis, beginning in 2008, the city had the highest
infant mortality rate in the country: twice the U.S. average. Statistically the epidemic
was worse than in some Third World countries. One of the results of the epidemic (to my
horror) was the existence of a public cemetery nicknamed “Babyland,” heavily populated
by babies the county buries for parents who cannot afford a funeral. Although the
reasons for the epidemic are complex, the city and county largely ignored the rising
infant mortality in Memphis until it had reached epidemic proportions and became a
matter of national news.4
A personal observation I first noted upon moving to Memphis is that in portions
of the city, people live in dilapidated houses that externally seem unlivable. (The only
1

See Bruce Kennedy, America’s 11 poorest cities. https://www.facebook.com
/CBSMoneyWatch, 18 Feb. 2015. Web. 6 July 2016.
2

See Tanzina Vega, “Blacks Still Far Behind Whites in Wealth and Income.” CNN 27,
June 2016. Web. 6 July 2016.
3

See Sendhil Mullainathan, “Police Killings of Blacks: Here Is What the Data Say.” The
New York Times, 26 Nov. 2015. Web. 6 July 2016.
4

See Erin Mcclam, “A city’s grief: Memphis’ infant death epidemic.” msnbc.com.
Associated Press, 11 Nov. 2007. Web. 6 July 2016.
1

analog I can compare it to are poor towns I passed through on a trip to Mexico years
ago). In such areas, alongside populated homes were abandoned boarded-up houses that
probably should have been torn down years ago. When I moved from Memphis to
Baltimore, I had the same experience except in the context of an east-coast city. In East
and West Baltimore, one can easily find blocks of row houses (homes attached to each
other) that are dilapidated and abandoned next to inhabited homes and neighborhoods.
These uninhabited buildings are a blight on the city, yet there has not been any substantial
effort by the city to revitalize these neighborhoods. Touring West Baltimore, presidential
candidate Bernie Sanders commented, “Anyone who took the walk that we took around
this neighborhood would not think you're in a wealthy nation. You would think that you
were in a Third World country.”5
Baltimore, in particular, has entered the national spotlight due to the death of
Freddie Gray.6 In light of multiple nationwide instances of brutality and death of young
black men receiving public attention in the past three years, police department reform is
now part of the national debate.7 The purpose of the Black Lives Matter movement is to
address what the group perceives as the anti-black racism within law enforcement and

5

See John Fritze, “Bernie Sanders likens West Baltimore to ‘Third World’ country.”
baltimoresun.com. The Baltimore Sun, 8 Dec. 2015. Web. 6 July 2016.
6

Freddie Gray was arrested April 12, 2015 for allegedly carrying a switchblade. While
being transported in a police van, Gray received injuries to his spinal cord resulting in his death.
A week later before criminal charges against six police officers were announced, multiple protests
and rioting occurred in response to Gray’s death.
7

Although the death of Trayvon Martin in 2012 sparked national discussion about the
killing of young black men, Michael Brown’s death in 2014 at the hands of a police officer
solidified police reform as a national topic.
2

society in general.8 Considering the events mentioned, and the wide gap in wealth
between black and white Americans, racial equality is still an important topic worthy of
philosophical analysis, particularly in the context of disadvantaged African-American
communities.9
Using the framework of liberal political theory, this dissertation is a collection of
papers providing an assessment of various philosophical problems in respect to AfricanAmerican racial justice. It begins with the first two chapters respectively providing
arguments for understanding the socio-political status and the civic and natural moral
duties of disadvantaged African-American communities. The third chapter argues for a
reformation of John Rawls’s political theory to address corrective racial justice (with an
emphasis on disadvantaged African-American communities). The last chapter questions
whether liberalism is practically capable of changing anti-black attitudes, beliefs and
behaviors, which perpetuate racial inequality.
The first chapter is a reprint with annotations of an article published in The Wire
and Philosophy.10 Although it is a popular piece, primarily of interest to fans of the
television show The Wire, philosophically the article argues that the criminal and
immoral behavior of some residents in disadvantaged African-American neighborhoods
is fully understood in the context of belonging to communities neglected by the state. In
8

Patrice Cullors,, Opal Tometi, and Alicia Garza “About Black lives matter.”
blacklivesmatter.com. n.d. Web. 6 July 2016.
9

“Disadvantaged African-American communities” refers to African-American
communities which entail residents who are isolated from mainstream society, unemployed or
underemployed, impoverished, and subjected to high crime rates and poor public services
(education and police enforcement for example).
10

See William Allen, “Locke’d in the Game,” The Wire and Philosophy, ed. David
Bzdak, Joanna Crosby and Seth Vannatta (Chicago: Open Court, 2013), 31-41.
3

the Introduction, through examples in the TV show, I provide a characterization of
disadvantaged communities in the The Wire as a virtual warzone, due to high crime and
lack of safety. In the next section, I provide an argument (influenced by an article by
philosopher Lionel McPherson11) that the existential state of disadvantaged communities
in The Wire is akin to Thomas Hobbes’s “state of nature,” due the fact that it is a
survivalist environment.12
In the third section, I argue that the Hobbesian characterization is incorrect
because the residents of disadvantaged communities are citizens (a characteristic absent
in people living in Hobbes’s state of nature). I argue that the disadvantaged communities
of The Wire are better understood as in a “state of war” indicative of John Locke’s
political theory.13 Locke argues that when citizens are neglected or oppressed by the
state to the extent that they do not enjoy their full rights, citizens are in a state of war
against the state and justified to act as they see fit in order to survive.
In the fourth section, I use Locke’s account of the state of war to explain the
actions of residents in the disadvantaged communities of The Wire. Using specific
examples from the The Wire, I argue that the characters that turn to crime or drug use
cannot be judged simply based on individual actions. Their moral failings are better
understood as being partly due to living in oppressive conditions with few options to

11

See Lionel McPherson, “Criminal-Justice Minded: Retribution, Punishment, and
Authority,” Hip Hop and Philosophy: Rhyme 2 Reason (popular Culture and Philosophy Series,
ed. Derrick Darby and Tommie Shelby (Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 2005), 173-182.
12

See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc., 1994).
13

See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
4

better their well-being. Any individual moral failing is also a failure of the state to
provide conditions for residents of disadvantaged communities to pursue fruitful life
plans. I end the article with an observation by Locke that when any citizens are allowed
to be oppressed, it is due to a failure of citizens to sympathize with the oppressed; thus
any revitalization of disadvantaged communities requires sympathy and activism from
average citizens.
The second chapter is a response to philosopher Tommie Shelby’s article “Justice,
Deviance and the Dark Ghetto.”14 Shelby argues that disadvantaged African-American
communities do not have a responsibility to perform civic duties (duties qua citizen).
This is because the state has failed to treat the members of such communities as full
citizens. However, such communities are responsible for performing natural duties
(duties qua moral agents) because they are binding even when not reciprocated by
individuals or institutions.
I argue that Shelby’s argument becomes problematic when he professes that
certain acts that would normally be violations of natural duties are permissible in the
context of disadvantaged African-American communities. For example, he entertains
that prostitution, theft and drug dealing are morally justifiable in such communities if
they are performed for the sake of survival. His argument is problematic because he does
not sufficiently explain how self-preservation, for example, overrides the duty to respect
the personhood of others (in the case of theft and drug dealing) or the duty of self-respect
(in the case of prostitution).

14

See Tommie Shelby, “Justice, Deviance and the Dark Ghetto,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 35 (2007): 126-16.
5

After describing Shelby’s dilemma of conflicting duties, I argue that the root of
Shelby’s mistake is that he conflates what is reasonable with what is moral. It may be
reasonable for the sake of survival that one turns to criminal activities, given the
oppressive environment of disadvantaged African-American communities. However, just
because one can understand why someone may reasonably be compelled to commit
crimes does not make it morally justifiable.
As an alternative to Shelby, I propose in the last section that criminal acts in
disadvantaged communities should be morally condemned except in rare cases of
immediate life and death (e.g. a need to steal a medicine in order to save a loved one’s
life). However, even though most criminal acts in disadvantaged African-American
communities can be morally condemned, I add that because local, state and federal
governments helped to create and sustain such communities, these institutions share the
blame for such acts as well.
In the third chapter, I assess the debate between philosophers Charles Mills and
Tommie Shelby concerning whether Rawls’s political theory is applicable to corrective
racial justice. Charles Mills is critical of Rawls’s political theory because it is rooted in
ideal theory.15 Rawls’s theory fundamentally proposes principles of justice, which he
believes are justifiable in creating an ideal pluralistic liberal democratic state. The
problem, according to Mills, is that such a theory ignores past racial injustice in actual
nonideal liberal states. Mills charges Rawls with employing a traditional method among

15

Ideal theory, according to Rawls, is the construction of principles of justice that are
used to develop a “perfectly just basic structure and the corresponding duties and obligations of
persons.” This contrasts with nonideal theory which is concerned with issues of justice in an
imperfect society. See John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971), 43.
6

white male philosophers of proposing abstract theories that exclude the actual history of
white supremacy and marginalizing the experience and interests of nonwhites.
Shelby, in defense of Rawls, recognizes that Rawls’s theory does not address
nonideal theory and thus does not directly address corrective racial justice. However,
Shelby argues that the existing features of Rawls’s theory, such as the principles of
justice, are fundamental to addressing issues of corrective racial justice. Prior to
proposing particular principles that correct past racial injustices such as the denial of
citizenship rights and the economic exploitation of African Americans, there first must be
universal principles that grant all citizens equal rights and establish a fair economic
system. Essentially, Shelby argues that ideal theory is needed first, as a guide to doing
nonideal theory.
In response to Shelby, Mills charges Shelby with conflating distributive justice
(indicative of Rawls’s theory) with corrective justice. The former, which concerns the
distribution of resources and offices, is inapplicable to African-American reparationist
calls for an apology, the recognition of wrongdoing and/or the restoration of civic trust.
Mills also criticizes Shelby for erroneously arguing that resolving economic justice alone
can also resolve corrective racial justice. In the last article of the debate, Shelby
essentially refutes Mills’s criticisms by claiming that Mills misread him (Shelby). The
passages Mills cites, and which serve as fodder for his criticisms, do not pertain to
corrective racial justice, according to Shelby. Shelby then reiterates in detail his defense
of Rawls as applied to corrective racial justice, particularly stressing that ideal theory is a
guide to doing nonideal theory.

7

After recounting the debate, in section five, I argue that Mills’s criticism of Rawls
as perpetuating the marginalization of nonwhites is cogent. However, Mills’s
characterization is incomplete because Rawls’s omission of white supremacy and
corrective racial justice is better understood as a manifestation of white privilege. As a
privileged, white, male scholar, I propose that Rawls’s omission is not due to malicious
intent, but to an ignorance of or indifference to the import of addressing the experience
and interests of nonwhites. White privilege partly entails that whites are capable of being
ignorant of living in a racialized world, such that addressing racial justice is not of
interest to them. I also criticize Mills for not fully considering that corrective racial
justice must address psychic harm. I use disadvantaged African-American communities
as an example of a situation where psychic harm (such as disrespect, distrust and
disempowerment) must be addressed in concert with correcting material harm (such as
poverty and unemployment).
My primary criticisms of Shelby are that he is too dismissive of the need for
African-American reparations, and I contend that the demarcation he makes between
reformative justice and rectificatory justice is inapplicable to disadvantaged AfricanAmerican communities. Textual evidence shows that Shelby believes that correcting the
material condition of African Americans may dissipate calls for reparations. I argue that
such a position ignores the import of an apology and recognition of wrongdoing on behalf
of the state to reestablish civic trust among African Americans. Shelby’s division
between reformative justice and rectificatory justice ignores communities that are due
both. Specifically, I argue that the state is partly responsible for the creation of
disadvantaged African-American communities and currently perpetuates the existence of

8

such communities. Past and present harms in such communities are not easily separated;
therefore, disadvantaged African-American communities are an example of a community
in which both types of justice are due and interdependent.
In the last section, I assess Mills’s tentative proposal for reform and propose my
own tentative principle of corrective racial justice. I argue that Mills’s nonideal
principles of corrective racial justice fail to fully address psychic social goods and ignore
the specific needs of African-American women qua woman and other marginalized racial
groups. As an alternative, I propose a principle that includes such features in addition to
the recognition of white supremacy as the nexus of racial injustice and the need for a
national critical narrative with white supremacy as the nexus.
In the last chapter, I argue that liberal political theory is limited in its ability to
bring about racial equality. Keeping the plight of disadvantaged African-American
communities in mind, I argue that the passing of policies and programs aimed at racial
equality and the betterment of African Americans requires not only support from
politicians but support from the public at large. If a majority of the public holds antiblack sentiments and beliefs toward African Americans, then there will not be enough
sympathy in support of policies and practices aimed at racial equality. This presents a
problem for liberal theorists. Ultimately, I argue that liberalism does not have an
effective method for changing citizens or coercing them to discard anti-black prejudices,
beliefs and attitudes.
I begin by arguing that part of the problem pertains to three theoretical flaws
within traditional liberal theory.16 First, traditional liberalism values respecting the
16

“Traditional liberal theory” refers to the canonical conception of liberalism which gives
primacy to individual liberties over other values. In various forms, the concept of liberty is found
9

autonomy of citizens absolutely. The state is neutral in relation to the personal beliefs
and attitudes of citizens. The state only interferes in the private actions of citizens for the
sake of preventing citizens from directly harming each other. Thus, although liberalism
obliges the prevention of obvious discrimination in the workplace, it cannot prevent
citizens from holding racist or prejudicial beliefs and discriminating in their private
associations. Secondly, liberal philosophers’ tendency to rely on ideal theory (which
entails conceiving of liberal states as ideal societies with ideal rational actors) abstracts
away from nonideal actual socio-political societies such that it cannot fully address actual
social problems (such as the public holding irrational, false and prejudiced beliefs and
attitudes). Related to the previous flaw, I once again insert Charles Mills’s criticism that
due to the reliance on ideal theory, many liberal theorists omit the role white supremacy
plays in reasoning about matters of justice. This being the case, issues of racial justice
are ignored or minimized in the work of liberal theorists.
In order to correct these theoretical flaws, I propose that liberal theorists turn to
untraditional liberal theories, nonliberal theories and critical theories to find solutions.
To address the prohibition of using state action to change anti-black sentiments and
beliefs, I argue that a moderate liberal perfectionism may be a partial solution. A
moderate liberal perfectionism permits the state to use coercion and incentives to change
illiberal behavior. To address the overreliance on ideal theory, I propose that liberal
theorists borrow Marxism’s emphasis on utilizing the actual historical conditions of states

in classical contract theorists such as Locke and Kant, but is most exemplified in the work of John
Stuart Mill and his Harm Principle which restrict government from interfering with the liberty of
citizens (except to prevent citizens harming each other.) See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1978).
10

to do political philosophy. This includes acknowledging and referencing the history of
white supremacy as a fundamental factor in theorizing about racial justice.
In the last section, I argue that even though my proposals solve the theoretical
limitations of traditional liberalism, they do not resolve the underlying problem with
liberalism in terms of theory being effective in practice. If it is the case that anti-black
sentiment is pervasive as I contend, then it seems any proposals (philosophical or
otherwise) will never get enough public support to become policy and practice.
Referencing law professor Derrick Bell’s assessment that racism is a permanent feature
of American society, I contend that a dilemma appears for a liberal theorist. The theorist
has to either consider abandoning liberalism for illiberal means to achieve full racial
equality, or remain a liberal theorist and abandon the goal of full racial equality for
African Americans.
The dissertation is concerned throughout with understanding the socio-political
status of disadvantaged African-American communities and racial justice for such
communities. However, I allow that with proper contextual orientation, many of the
arguments discussed may be applicable to a variety of marginalized and oppressed
groups.

11

Chapter 2
Locke’d in the Game?1
Introduction
The most frightening character on the The Wire is Marlo Stanfield.2 The only
time we see him shoot someone, he is calm and collected. He is generally quiet and
rarely do we see him angry. But the cold, calculating, and ruthless manner in which he
conducts himself as leader of the Stanfield Crew makes him the last person I would like
to come across in a dark alley.
Take for example a particularly chilling scene between Marlo and a grocery store
security guard. At a neighborhood convenience store, Marlo blatantly steals some
lollipops in front of a security guard, and the security guard confronts him outside. The
security guard is frustrated—he has a crummy job, but one that supports his family. He
tells Marlo that he knows who Marlo is and that he is not attempting “step to” him or
“disrespect” him, but “I am a man, and you just clipped that shit like you don’t even
know I’m there.” Unmoved, Marlo’s response is “I don’t” (“Refugees”) 3.
The security guard is merely trying to get Marlo to recognize him as a fellow
human being struggling to make a living, who is worthy a modicum of respect. Based on
Marlo’s response, he obviously does not care about recognizing the security guard as a
person due respect, nor does he empathize with the security guard’s plight. The security
1

This chapter is a reprint of an article printed in The Wire and Philosophy. Annotations
have been added. William Allen, “Locke’d in the Game,” The Wire and Philosophy, ed. David
Bzdak, Joanna Crosby and Seth Vannatta (Chicago: Open Court, 2013), 31-41.
2

The character Marlo Stanfield is a drug lord introduced in Season 3 who is ruthless in
his attempts to maintain and expand his drug empire.
3

“Refugees.” The Wire. Dir. Jim Mckay, HBO. 1 Oct. 2006. Television.
12

guard is “nobody” from Marlo’s perspective. The writers underscore this point by not
giving the security guard a name and not showing his death, which results from the
conversation.
Marlo only cares about himself and his interests; his main concern is protecting
his rep and the empire he’s built. He cares little about abiding by the social mores of
those of us living in mainstream society, and he’s arguably amoral. From his perspective,
murder and other heinous acts he authorizes aren’t subject to moral scrutiny, only to the
cold, practical rules necessary to survive in the Game. The security guard, by
confronting Marlo, falls into the category of someone challenging Marlo’s power and
thus the security guard has to pay for the act with his life.
In many ways Marlo embodies the (real or imagined) fears people have of
African-American men from poor urban communities (if not African-American men in
general). Many people view African-American men in such communities as not having a
moral conscience and refusing to abide by mainstream social values and customs. If
these African-American men had a proper system of values, (like those of the Puritan
work ethic offered in the introduction), then African-American communities wouldn’t
need something like Hamsterdam4 to make those spaces livable again, or so say
politicians and political pundits when discussing the plight of the urban poor.

4

“Hamsterdam” is a fictional neighborhood introduced in Season 3, episode 4 in which
illegal drug trade is made permissible by a West Baltimore police major. The character Major
Howard “Bunny” Colvin secretly establishes a police monitored uninhabited neighborhood as a
zone for drug dealers to operate (with the caveat that they can only sell drugs in the designated
area.) For the short time it lasts, the Hamsterdam experiment results in a reduction of drug
related crime in West Baltimore. The name is a mistaken reference to “Amsterdam” by the drug
dealers in the program.
13

Another explanation that The Wire seems to promote is that such communities
exist due to severe neglect by public institutions. Poor education, police enforcement,
and public services in general create an environment of poverty and unemployment in
which crime seems like the most reasonable means of survival. Such a position is not
intended to absolve someone like Marlo of the crimes he commits, but it indicates that
mere individual choice, responsibility, and “cultural values” are not enough to explain
such actions.
The Game Is War, No One Is Safe
One way to understand the life of the urban poor, or underclass, of The Wire is
that of living in an anarchic war zone. This description is particularly appropriate during
times where rival gangs battle over control of corners (for example the StanfieldBarksdale war5). But even in times of “normal” street activity, the residents live under
the constant threat of violence, theft, and other crimes, so that no one really lives in
peace.
The drug dealers are continually on watch for the police, rival gangs, and stick-up
men such as Omar.6 The average non- drug dealing residents, those Omar dubs
‘citizens’, have to be vigilant against becoming collateral damage of gang violence, being
robbed by drug addicts, and drawing the ire of drug dealers (as the security guard did
with Marlo).

5

This references two rival drug gangs in Season 3 (the Stanfield Organization and the
Barksdale Organization) who engage in a violent war over territory in West Baltimore.
6

Omar Little is a character that first appears in Season 1. He is a “stick-up man” who
primarily robs drug dealers. Obtaining an almost mythical status in the series, he is the bane of
drug dealers and feared by residents in Baltimore.
14

A good example of how average residents in the community are constantly on
watch is shown in their reaction to the appearance of Omar. Every time he is seen
walking out of his home, (even if his intention is merely to re-up on Honey Nut
Cheerios), the residents in the neighborhood warn “Omar comin’,” sending those outside
running into their homes in fear of violence. Their reaction is like the residents of a dusty
town in an old western movie when an outlaw rolls in on his horse.
However, we’re far past the days of the lawless Wild West. How is it possible
that a virtual war zone can exist in the United States? Isn’t everyone in our nation due
the protection of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” as stated in the Declaration
of Independence? As citizens, don’t we have a right to certain “social goods” such as
public education and law enforcement, valuable (if not necessary) things for creating a
good life? In the disadvantaged communities of The Wire these things are minimally
protected or unavailable to the point of being virtually nonexistent. Average residents
such as the security guard, William Gant (the witness who testified against D’Angelo),
and Nakeesha Lyles (the witness who changed her testimony against D) are not even
secure in their right to life.7
At first glance, The Wire’s characterization of the underclass as living in a war
zone without state protection might prompt someone familiar with the seventeenthcentury philosopher Thomas Hobbes to say: “These people are living in the state of

7

The characters referenced pertain to the Season 1, episode 1 “The Target.” The
character D’Angelo Barksdale, nephew of drug lord Avon Barksdale, is on trial for murder. Two
witnesses to the murder, William Gant and Nakeesha Lyles are executed by the Barksdale
Organization after they testify in court. Lyles is bribed and actually changes her testimony in
court, yet she is killed in order to cover up the bribery. “The Target.” The Wire. Dir. Clark
Johnson. HBO. 1 Jun. 2002. Television.
15

nature!”8 Hobbes argues in The Leviathan that when people do not live in a civil state
bound by laws and the protection of rights, people are at war with each other; they live in
what he calls a “state of nature.”9
Because there’s no government restricting people’s activities, Hobbes claims that
people have complete freedom to do whatever they wish. We’re naturally selfish,
unsocial, competitive, and power-seeking. So, according to Hobbes, without restrictions,
people in the state of nature act out of self-interest and self-preservation. It’s survival of
the fittest, and you best show up willing to fight.
Hobbes would clearly understand the interaction between Marlo and the security
guard. Since Hobbes claims that no one in the state of nature recognizes anyone else’s
rights, and there is no morality, people will resort to killing, stealing, and doing whatever
they deem necessary in order to survive. In this environment people are continually in
fear of harm from others, thus everyone views their neighbor as a potential enemy.
Hobbes claims that in this “state of war”:
Nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have
there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law,
no injustice.10
If you buy Hobbes’s product, then Marlo’s actions are justifiable. From such a
perspective, eliminating potential threats is necessary to survive in the Game. Morality is

8

This position is argued by Lionel McPherson for example. See Lionel
McPherson,“Criminal-Justice Minded: Retribution, Punishment, and Authority,” Hip Hop and
Philosophy: Rhyme 2 Reason (Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 2005), 173-182.
9

See Book 1, Chapter 13 in the Leviathan for Hobbes account of the state of nature.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.,
1994).
10

Ibid., 78.
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moot. Since people can literally get away with murder, belief in the concept of justice is
absurd. Even when people such as Marlo and Avon Barksdale are caught, ‘justice’ is not
reflected in the extent of their punishment. This perspective is not the result of pure
individual choice or values, but living in an environment without governance.
However, Hobbes claims that the state of nature is only possible for people who
do not live in a civil state. Call Baltimore what you will, it’s still a part of the United
States. So although Marlo, the Corner Kids, and Bubbles 11 all live in an isolated
environment, they technically are citizens of the United States due the same rights to
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” as the rest of us. How is it that they can live
in a state of nature while living in a country with rights and laws?
The Game Beyond the Game
We’d have a much more difficult time describing Baltimore’s west side as a state
of nature, given John Locke’s conception. Locke, a successor to Hobbes, argues
similarly to Hobbes that in the absence of government people exist in a “state of nature.”
However, in Locke’s state of nature people are more or less peaceful and generally
understand and recognize others as due natural, inalienable rights. 12
Instead of finding a picture of Baltimore’s oppressed communities in Hobbes’s
description of the state of nature, it’s Locke’s discussion of the state of nature where we
find the Baltimore of The Wire. Locke addresses the fact that there can exist small
11

The Corner Kids refer to four characters living in West Baltimore: Dukie, Randy,
Namond and Michael. They first appear in the fourth season. Seasons 4 and 5 document the
travails of the young men as they mature from adolescence to teenagers. Bubbles is a recurring
character throughout the series who struggles with drug addiction.
12

See Locke’s second treatise, chapters 2 and 3 for his account of the “state of nature”
and “state of war.” John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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groups of citizens who‘re oppressed in a nation where the majority of citizens enjoy the
protection of rights and social goods. In such a situation, Locke claims that the oppressed
group is in a state of war.
Whereas the state of war and state of nature are the same for Hobbes, Locke
makes a distinction between the two. Locke recognizes that, on the one hand, even in his
state of nature, small groups of people can seek to harm others. When they do, it’s a state
of war. However, Locke also recognizes that within an existing nation, the government
or other citizens can oppress a minority group. When there is no authority one can appeal
to, Locke would describe that minority group as being in a state of war with the rest of
society.
So the question arises: do Marlo, Snoop, Bodie, Bubbles, Cutty, Namond’s
mother, and Randy’s foster mother collectively count as an oppressed group of citizens in
a “state of war” as Locke proposes?13 Technically, as citizens, they all have legal rights
to life, liberty, property, and social goods. They receive public services, can call the
police, and send their children to public schools. However, that doesn’t guarantee that
their alleys will remain clear, that the police will come in a timely manner or prove
effective, nor that schools will actually teach them or their children. The problem is not
the mere provision of services and rights, but the quality of services and adequate
protection of rights.
In The Wire, the Baltimore police department is unable to eliminate drug activity.
Due to the political jockeying of state officials from the police department to the mayor’s

13

Snoop is an enforcer in the Stanfield Organization. Bodie is member of the Barksdale
Organization, and Cutty is a reformed criminal who opens a boxing gym in West Baltimore.
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office, Lt. Daniels’s drug detail14 and other officers are compelled to “juke the stats”
rather than effectively combat the drug gangs. Their weak efforts are further undermined
by corrupt politicians like Clay Davis, and unscrupulous lawyers such as Maurice Levy
who protect the drug lords. The most the police are able to do is harass the low-level
drug dealing kids like Bodie, pushing them off their corner for an hour or two. The
Barksdale and Stanfield gangs are able to sell drugs, intimidate the local community, and
commit murder with virtual impunity. Even when the police are able to arrest the drug
lords, the vacuum created is quickly filled. In the end, the benefit police bring to the
disadvantaged neighborhoods of The Wire is almost nonexistent. As Public Enemy
rapped, “911 is a joke.”15
In the public schools there are some teachers concerned with the education and
well-being of their students, such as Prez.16 However, the teachers are overworked and
forced to meet the demands of an Educational Board more concerned with bumping up
state test scores than truly educating children. The effectiveness of the teachers is further
limited in that the problems the students face at home and in their neighborhoods lead to
poor attendance, dropping out, and behavioral problems. Possible solutions, such as
Bunny Colvin’s program with the corner kids, are eliminated because of lack of
government support. As portrayed in The Wire, teachers’ efforts to educate and help their
students are undermined by factors inside and outside the school environment.
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This refers to the character Lt. Cedric Daniels whose police detail against drug gangs in
West Baltimore is a central focus of the series.
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Public Enemy, “911 is a Joke.” Fear of a Black Planet (Def Jam. 1990).
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“Prez” refers to a recurring character on the show who is an ex-police officer who
becomes a public school teacher in West Baltimore in Seasons 3 and 4.
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Institutional neglect on the part of government at all levels violates the inalienable
right that people should have to substantial and equal opportunities for creating a good
life, what we like to call ‘the pursuit of happiness.’ Thus we can say that the underclass
of The Wire is oppressed, living in a state of war, and that Locke’s account is a better
than Hobbes’s.
The Game is Rigged. . . Play or Get Played
For those living in an environment where participants in the drug game are the
best off financially, crime is a constant concern, public services are lacking, and the
larger mainstream society does not seem to care about their plight. So it’s not surprising
that some people in the underclass of The Wire find themselves falling victim to the traps
of street life in order to survive.
When introduced in Season Four, the Boys of Summer: Michael, Dukie, Randy
and Namond are portrayed as “average” adolescents.17 In many respects they are—they
go to school, they have a burgeoning interest in girls, and they like to joke around and
play pranks. However, as the show delves deeper into their lives, it’s evident that all of
them have to deal with the effects of their negligent, even abusive, parents. Aside from
their home lives, they have to navigate an environment of poverty, unemployment,
violence, and drug addiction, while trying to resist the allure of the drug game. As we
observe their coming of age, it’s clear that the cards are stacked against their having a
“normal” mainstream life. The Game is rigged against even them.
From the beginning, the Boys of Summer already understand that the police are
unreliable (and some corrupt), school serves no practical purpose for survival in their
17

The “Boys of Summer” is another label for the Corner Kids.
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world, and most adults (including their parents) have no genuine concern for them. They
are essentially alone. To survive, these young people have to rely on their own wits and
take advantage of the opportunities the streets provide. Such an attitude toward public
institutions and their community shows that the Boys of Summer (and makers of The
Wire) do not believe that public institutions are effective in protecting and promoting
their “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.”
In light of what the Boys of Summer have to struggle with, it’s not surprising that,
by the end of the series, most of the teens meet the same fates as other people in their
community. Michael, in order to protect himself and his young brother, becomes a
“soldier” for the Stanfield Crew, and thereafter a stick-up kid robbing drug dealers. He
becomes essentially the new Omar. Dukie, left homeless when abandoned by his drug
addicted parents, becomes a drug addict himself. He’s following in the footsteps of
Bubbles and other drug addicts in the community. Randy is branded a “snitch” due to the
police mistakenly leaking details of his coerced cooperation. As a result, his foster
mother’s home is firebombed, and he is sent to a group home where he is abused by the
other teenagers. A once jovial kid, he’s transformed into an angry teenager with an
uncertain future.
By the end of the series, the only original member of the group who has the
possibility of a “good life” in mainstream society is Namond, who’s adopted by Bunny
Colvin and moved out of the ’hood to a middle-class neighborhood. We first meet
Namond as a wannabe thug, but he’s the only one in the group who continues to go to
school, and ends up excelling as a member of the debate team (an activity he probably
would have previously mocked as for punks). The series implies that Namond’s success
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is due to taking him out of the underclass community, allowing him to form a bond with
people who‘re part of the mainstream, and immersing him in a community in which he
can benefit from mainstream opportunities.
Morality and “the Other Way” of the Game
Blaming the outcome of Michael, Dukie, and Randy on individual choices and
poor parenting is not a sufficient explanation of their fate. The perpetual cycle of
poverty, unemployment, poor schooling, and poor police enforcement are responsible for
the limited choices they have available in their community.
Locke argues that people living in a state of war do not have an obligation to obey
the state’s laws, recognize its authority, nor abide by social norms. Because the state fails
to sufficiently protect the rights of the oppressed community, he would say that all acts
used to secure your rights are justifiable. He provides an example of punishing a thief in
a state of war. He claims that the victim of theft is justified in killing the thief, if the
victim deems such a punishment fit. Even though such a punishment does not seem to fit
the crime, it is justified since there is no common authority to protect rights and dictate
the norms of punishment. This being the case, people are left to protect themselves based
on their own judgment (however flawed their judgment might be).
In light of Locke’s argument we can see how the Avons and Marlos of the
underclass come to be. In a community without proper governance, some people view
criminal activity as a good way to secure life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of
happiness. In the ’hood, the drug game is the best way to earn a substantial income.
Even though drug dealing involves violence, risk of imprisonment, and death, without
other viable opportunities available, within that context, it is a rational choice.

22

From such a perspective, actions that we consider immoral (and arguably are
immoral) are heavily determined by the living conditions, made possible due to profound
institutional neglect. Thus we can understand Marlo Stanfield better, though we can
certainly condemn some of his actions. Locke would tell us that, even in a state of war,
people still have inalienable rights, but we can choose to violate such rights. He thought
that people who violate inalienable rights are aware of what they’re doing. For example,
being creatures with the capacity of reason, we know that murder is wrong.
Marlo’s demeanor and rhetoric seem to be those of a person who is amoral, but he
is aware that mainstream society has values that involve being civil and respecting rights.
Returning to the security guard incident, Marlo ends the conversation by reminding the
security guard of the reality they both live in: “You want it to be one way, but it is the
other way” (“Refugees,” Season Four). Initially, this may seem cryptic. However Marlo
is telling the security guard that they both know the reality of their community. The drug
dealers are the ones with power and the ’hood is governed by the rules of the street; but
the security guard asserts (through being confrontational) that he wants it “one way.”
The security guard wants to live in an environment where everyone respects the law and
people respect each other. Unfortunately this is not the environment they live in; it’s “the
other way.”
Marlo’s point is that such values and rights of the mainstream are not recognized
in his particular community. He is aware that in the mainstream, people are due rights
and such rights are protected. Keeping Locke in mind, Marlo is probably even aware that
his community and all human beings are due certain rights, but since such rights are not
protected, and violating them is useful, he feels no obligation to respect them.
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However, apart from Marlo’s beliefs or whether Marlo is amoral, his actions can
be judged. Locke suggests that, apart from any one person’s or group’s standard of
morality, what is moral depends on whether it’s consistent with the natural use of reason.
This concept has its problems, but I would chance to say that Marlo was very, very wrong
for having the security guard killed. That act deserves a high level of moral
condemnation. The security guard was no real threat to Marlo. I doubt the security guard
would have bragged to people on the street about confronting Marlo, such that it would
damage Marlo’s rep. It was a slight transgression with no foreseeable repercussions.
Marlo could have let the incident go.
Other acts by characters in the series are not as easy to judge. For example, what
level of blame can we place on the average kid on the corner selling drugs? Certainly, we
can say that Michael, Wallace, and Bodie are wrong for selling drugs to people with an
addiction; it’s the exploitation of people with an illness. However, in many cases
(Michael being a prime example) we have to consider that selling drugs is the best, if not
only, option to support oneself and loved ones in poor urban areas.
Without condoning the Game, it’s not the fault of these kids, certainly it’s less
their fault than say a person without such burdens. The Wire reminds us that these kids
should not have to live in an environment in which they feel compelled to sell drugs in
the first place. If they were born into a mainstream environment with its benefits and
opportunities, there is a high probability that they (and everyone in the community, even
Marlo) would have made different choices. I could easily see Marlo as CEO of a
corporation.
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The Game Is the Game. Always?
Locke claims that the ordeal of the oppressed is only possible when the majority
of citizens fail to sympathize with the plight of the oppressed and their claims, thus
allowing the government to further that oppression. We can fail to sympathize with the
plight of residents living in poverty-stricken areas if we don’t feel that the oppressed
group’s condition affects our own well-being. Simply put, if the majority of citizen’s
don’t feel they’re oppressed nor have concern for the oppressed, the majority sees no
reason to challenge government. Locke expresses this in the following:
For till the mischief be grown general, and the ill designs of the rulers become
visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part, the people, who are more
disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance, are not apt to stir. The
examples of particular injustice or oppression of here and there an unfortunate
man moves them not.18
Without the support of the larger society, the members of the oppressed group
have no power to force the government to protect their rights; their pleas fall on deaf ears.
Locke concludes that the only appeal left is one to the Heavens. Talk about deaf ears. In
other words, the oppressed are screwed.
The Wire and Locke suggest that as long as public official sand common citizens
collectively continue to be apathetic about the plight of the underclass, succeeding
generations of people will be trapped in such conditions. In the last episode of the series,
we see that despite the elimination of key members of the Stanfield Gang, and changes in
public officials, the cycle of poverty, violence, unemployment and drug abuse continues.
There’re just new faces in old roles.

18

Locke (2004), 416-418.
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The Wire suggests that a large part of the problem is that politicians primarily act
for their own self-interest at the expense of the well-being of the public (the prime
example being both Mayor Royce and Mayor Carcetti who prioritize their political
ambitions above serving Baltimore).19 Part of the solution could lie in reforming our
public institutions so that they better serve the public interest of all citizens, rather than
just private interests. Keeping Locke in mind, the solution also requires that we as
common citizens take a more active role in ensuring our politicians act for the benefit of
all citizens. But then, we’d have to concern ourselves with the well-being of fellow
citizens outside our immediate communities.
The Wire, understood from the philosophy of Locke, gives the viewer an
understanding of how disadvantaged urban communities are created and why some
people in such communities are compelled to make certain choices. Aside from
providing entertainment, The Wire serves as a plea to its viewers, serving as a form of
artistic protest. By providing a realistic account of Baltimore that is complex and
intimate in its portrayal of characters, sympathetic to the plight of the underclass and
critical of public institutions, it forces the viewer to recognize the troubles of such
communities and sympathize with the people who live in them.
We can’t watch The Wire without feeling that something’s seriously wrong with
our public institutions. Viewed as a piece of protest art, The Wire is the creators’ attempt
to compel the viewer to sympathize with the plight of disadvantaged communities across
the nation, and engage in political action to bring about change.
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Mayor Royce is a character that first appears in Season 3. Mayor Carcetti’s run for the
mayor’s office and his subsequent administration is shown respectively in Seasons 4 and 5.
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Chapter 3
Reasonable and Moral Justification of Behavior in Disadvantaged
African-American Communities: A Critique of Tommie Shelby
Introduction
In light of civil unrest in response to police-related deaths in Ferguson, MO;
Baltimore, MD; Chicago, IL; etc., discussion about the plight of African-American
disadvantaged communities and their response to living in (what some deem) oppressive
conditions is relevant. At the time of writing this article, I reside in Baltimore, MD.
During the Freddie Gray protests and riots, I watched live local coverage of the several
days of civil unrest in the city. 1 Over the days, as I watched a protest that devolved into a
riot in which people threw rocks and debris at police officers, the looting of a mall and
the destruction of property, I wondered whether the participants were justifiably engaged
in acts of political resistance or simply criminal behavior.
Tommie Shelby, in his 2007 article “Justice, Deviance and the Dark Ghetto,”
attempts to provide criteria that distinguish the reasonable and moral behavior of
residents in disadvantaged African-American communities from behavior that is
unreasonable and immoral. He argues that disadvantaged African-American
communities are victims of an ineffective social structure that does not benefit them, and
thus members of such communities are not obliged to perform civic duties. However, as
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April 12, 2015, Baltimore resident Freddie Gray was arrested for possession of a
switchblade. En route to jail in a police van he died of a severe spinal cord injury. As details of
Gray’s death became public, evidence seemed to indicate that possibly Gray’s death was due to
the police failing to properly secure him in the police van. Nationwide, social activists against
police brutality interpreted the information as another case of police brutality against AfricanAmerican men. Nationwide protests resulted thereafter, culminating in several days of protest
and riots in Baltimore at the end of April, 2015.
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moral agents, they are obligated to perform certain natural duties (e.g. respecting the
personhood of others). Given the oppressive and survivalist environment of
disadvantaged African-American communities, Shelby allows that some natural duties
can be overridden for the sake of self-preservation and political resistance.
I argue that Shelby’s application of natural duties is unsound. It is unclear why
some acts are morally justifiable and others are not. Ostensibly, the problem seems to be
a failure to provide a method of resolving conflicts of duty; however, I argue that the root
problem is that Shelby conflates what is reasonable with what is moral. I provide an
alternative method for assessing acts in disadvantaged African-American communities
that calls for a stricter application of natural duties.
In light of the negative connotation of some terms Shelby employs, I replace his
terminology with less offensive nomenclature in the first section. I also provide a full
and clear account of the groups discussed. In the second section, I explain Shelby’s
distinction between civil and natural duties and their application to behavior in
disadvantaged African-American communities. Additionally, I argue that Shelby’s
concrete use of natural duties forces him into conflicts of duty he leaves unresolved. In
the third section, I propose a stricter application of natural duties that avoids the conflicts
of duty committed by Shelby. In the last section, I argue that the root methodological
error in Shelby’s use of natural duties is that he conflates what is reasonable with what is
moral.
Clarification of Terms
In this section, I replace some of Shelby’s terminology and define terms used
throughout the paper. Certain terms Shelby employs are unclear or potentially
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derogatory; therefore, I provide alternative terminology that provides specificity and
(hopefully) avoids negative connotations in reference to the groups being categorized.
Shelby states that his analysis applies to “ghettos” which he defines as “(1)
predominantly black, (2) urban neighborhoods, (3) with high concentrations of poverty.” 2
He acknowledges that there are Asian and Latino ghettos as well, but he chooses to use
the term without a modifier. For the sake of clarity, I use the term “disadvantaged
African-American communities” (hereafter referred to as DACs). I include high rates of
crime, high rates of drug use, high rates of unemployment/underemployment and poor
public services as characteristics of DACs. The addition of racial specificity
distinguishes DACs from other disadvantaged communities, which may not share such
characteristics or have features not found in DACs.
My replacement of “ghetto” is due to the historical negative connotation of the
word. Terms such as “ghetto” and “underclass” as labels for DACs have been imbued
with the connotation of DACs as communities whose residents are morally deficient,
behave in ways outside the norm of “decent” society and are ultimately a burden on the
rest of society.3 This assessment of DACs and its associated labels is important in the
context of Shelby’s paper because he attempts to provide a response to conservative
behaviorists and liberal structuralists who debate about whether such a judgment of
“ghettos” is warranted in the context of creating policies and programs aimed at such
2

Tommie Shelby, “Justice, Deviance and the Dark Ghetto,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 35 (2007): 134.
3

See sociologist Herbert J. Gans, The War Against the Poor (New York: Basic Books,
1995). He argues that terms such as “underclass” and “ghetto” have negative connotations that
support a negative perception of the poor, which ultimately effects policy decisions directed
toward the poor. Michael B. Katz makes a similar argument in his chapter the “The Underclass?”
in Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor (New York: Pantheon, 1989).
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communities.4 Conservative behaviorism and liberal structuralism refer to two
ideological perceptions of the poor that gained prominence among politicians and social
activists throughout the 1960s and were firmly entrenched in the political culture of the
1980s. Conservative behaviorists claim that the plight of “ghettos” is due to the erosion
of traditional American social values in such communities. They claim that the lack of a
Protestant work ethic and absence of traditional family structure are the primary causes of
pathological behavior in “ghettos.” Crime, unemployment and teen pregnancy are a
“way of life” and a part of the culture of such communities. Essentially, the conservative
behaviorist position is that if the attitudes and values of ghetto residents change, their
material condition would improve. Solutions advocated involve reinforcing traditional
family values and work ethic, self-help programs, black business expansion and nonpreferential job practices. In order to support their perspective and policy agenda with
regard to DACs, conservative behaviorists heavily use the term “ghetto” and “underclass”
in the media, imbuing such terms with negative connotations and reinforcing a negative
view of DACs.5 Shelby’s choice to use the label “ghetto” unintentionally evokes the
historically negative view of DACs as pathological communities, which some may find
offensive. Hopefully, the label I propose circumvents this problem.
The camp opposing the conservative behaviorists are liberal structuralists, who
claim that the effects of slavery, Jim Crow, job and residential discrimination, unequal
unemployment rates and poor public services (e.g. education, healthcare, etc.) are the root
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I borrow these terms and their definition from philosopher Cornel West in Cornel West,
Race Matters (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 17-22.
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Gans (1995), 11-26 and Katz (1989), 185-235 for discussion about the use of such
terminology and its influence on public policy.
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causes of the plight of DACs. The solution for them is not altering the culture or
behavior of members of such communities, but reforming the social and political
structure. Solutions they advocate include public policies aimed at improving
employment, health, education, child-care and Affirmative Action programs. Essentially,
they advocate for effective government policies, better bureaucrats and active citizens.
Shelby clearly sides with the liberal structuralist than the conservative behaviorist.
He essentially wishes to argue that he has a position that allows him to criticize the
harmful behavior of some members of DACs without evoking the conservative
behaviorist claim that such communities are pathological. As is evident in the next
section, fundamental to his argument is the liberal structuralist contention that the plight
of the DACs is due to an ineffective social and political structure. However, this does not
absolve residents of DACs of the basic moral duties they have to each other.
A second criticism of Shelby’s use of terms is that he is inconsistent in labeling
the subgroup of DACs that is the target of his criticism. His target group are people who
engage in particular acts of “deviancy” (behavior, attitudes and values that are “sharply
divergent from widely accepted norms” 6 such as crime, refusing to work legitimate jobs
and having contempt for authority). Such behaviors are attributes of residents he labels
as gangsters, hustlers, pimps and drug dealers. 7 Labeling these groups collectively, he
sometimes uses the terms “ghetto poor” or “persons from the ghetto who choose crime.”
6

Shelby (2007), 128.
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Shelby characterizes gangsters and hustlers in the following: “‘Gangsters’ use violence,
threats, and intimidation to forcibly extract money, goods, and services from others… The
criminal domain they operate in includes robbery, gambling rackets, loan sharking, and extortion.
‘Hustlers’ by contrast, use deception, manipulation, and treachery to achieve their objectives.
They are skillful liars…Their domain includes theft, fraud, prostitution and swindling.” Ibid.,
137.
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DACs are not homogenous; there are residents who share the same values pertaining to
work, family and education as most Americans. 8 It is important to clearly and
consistently maintain this distinction in order to avoid stereotyping residents of DACs.
Rather than using generalizing and potentially offensive terms such as “ghetto
poor,” I use sociologist Yasser Payne’s term, “street-life oriented people.” Cognizant of
past negative terminology applied to residents of DACs, Payne proposes “street-life
oriented people” as a replacement term for the subgroup Shelby wishes to focus on. 9 My
characterization of street-life oriented people stems from the work of both Payne and
sociologist Elijiah Anderson. Anderson, in Code of the Streets, explains that in response
to extreme poverty and joblessness, an oppositional culture to the conventional
mainstream appeared, which street-life oriented residents, in particular, abide by. The
street code and its corresponding culture entail a distrust of traditional institutions (law
enforcement, the judicial system and the welfare system) and a survivalist perspective of
the world that serves as a coping mechanism in an insecure environment. Anderson
writes:
All these social consequences of persistent urban poverty and joblessness coalesce
into acute alienation from mainstream society and its institutions, especially
among the young. What has formed as a result is a kind of institutionalized
oppositional culture, a reaction to a history of prejudice and discrimination that
now finds its way into schools and other institutions; it makes meaningful
participation in institutions dominated by those closely associated with the wider
society problematic, if not impossible, for many. The most public manifestation
of this alienation is the code of street, a kind of adaptation to a lost sense of
8

See the chapter “Decent and Street Families” in Elijah Anderson, Code of the Street:
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Company, Inc., 1999), 35-65.
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See Yasser A. Payne, “’Street Love’: How Street Life Oriented U. S. Born
African Men Frame Giving Back to One Another and the Local Community,”The Urban Review,
41 (2009): 31.
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security of the local inner-city neighborhood and, by extension, a profound lack of
faith in the police and the judicial system. 10
The street code can be understood within the framework of a survivalist egoism in
which it is permissible to engage in any act one deems suitable for one’s own and their
loved ones’ survival, even if it entails harming innocent people. Anderson notes that
central to the street code is campaigning for respect, usually through violence or the
perceived threat of violence. The perception by others that one is capable and quick to
violence serves to prevent instances of verbal or physical disrespect. However, Anderson
notes that, ironically, such a belief sustains violence in DACs because, in order to get
respect, it involves disrespecting others. Thus, campaigning for respect too often results
in violence.11
Finally, Anderson explains that although the street code is oppositional to
conventional society, it borrows from conventional society a primacy placed on
materialism. The accumulation of material goods (money, cars, jewelry, etc.) is valued as
a gauge of personal success that others respect and that serves to sustain self-respect.
Philosopher Cornel West makes the same observation and writes that the
overvaluing of material goods in DACs is a manifestation of the “market morality” found
in conventional society. Market morality prioritizes material goods, promotes immediate
forms of self-gratification and objectifies others for the sake of one’s own pleasure.
Values such as loving, caring and service to others are marginalized for the sake of
materialistic pursuits. Market morality fuels what West labels a type of nihilism in
DACs: “the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness,
10

Anderson (1999), 323.
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Ibid., 66-67.
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hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness.” 12 The failure to obtain materialistic
luxuries in conventional society (money, cars, jewelry, etc.) produces feelings of
worthlessness, isolation and meaninglessness indicative of the nihilism West describes.
In juxtaposition to Anderson and West, Payne adds that street-life oriented people
are not people whose values and behavior can be merely described as criminal or deviant.
Street-life oriented people possess virtues such as benevolence and fulfill what can be
considered communal duties. He terms the culmination of such acts “street love”:
Street love is conceptualized by Payne (2005) to manifest in three ways: (1)
individual expressions of street love: engaging in kind acts on an individual level
(i.e., loaning money, offering advice/counsel, etc.); (2) group expressions of street
love: engagement in group based bonding activities (i.e., playing pool, going to
the local bar, playing basketball, etc.); and (3) communal expressions of street
love: an individual or group of men in the streets who sponsor and/or organize a
social events in the local community (i.e., block party, given away free turkeys for
Thanksgiving, etc.)13
Although much of the behavior of street-life oriented people is consistent with the
survivalist egoism discussed, Payne argues that not all such actions should be perceived
as motivated purely by self-interest. Such a perception simplifies the psychology of
street-life oriented people and dehumanizes them. Payne concludes that despite the
complication of economic criminal motivations, street-life oriented people are interested
in giving back to their local communities, want more than what is provided by the streets
and, perhaps ironically, want to see an end to crime in their communities. 14
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West (1994), 23.
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Payne, (2009), 31.
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See Yasser A. Payne, The Peoples Report: The Link between Structural Violence and
Crime in Wilmington, Delaware (Wilmington, University of Delaware, 2013), 44.
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I do not think Shelby would disagree with my extrapolation of the values of the
street code and clarification of terms. He states early on that he wishes to avoid
promoting unwarranted negative associations and generalizations about the community
he wishes to critique. However, the clarification of terms and the full characterization of
street-life oriented people are necessary in order to assess whether, given the harsh
environment of DACs, some criminal acts permitted by the street code are morally
justifiable.
Shelby’s Application of Civic and Natural Duties in DACs
In analyzing people’s criticisms of DACs, Shelby claims that their criticisms fall
into the categories of failing to perform civic duties and/or failing to perform natural
duties.15 In a liberal framework, civic duties, according to Shelby, pertain to those duties
one is expected to perform as a member of a state. They are obligations people have qua
citizen. Influenced by Rawls, Shelby claims that in a liberal democratic state, citizens are
obliged to cooperate in maintaining a fair basic structure. 16 Citizens who are a part of
and benefit from a just society (a society with a fair basic structure) agree to do their fair
share to help society function smoothly and not take advantage of other citizens. Duties
Shelby discusses include obeying the law, respecting the rights of other citizens, working
a legal job for fair pay, educating oneself and working to become self-reliant. Criticisms
that members of DACs do not seek employment, do not seek education, depend on
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Shelby utilizes Rawls distinction between social and natural duties respectively in John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.), 144.
16

A fair basic structure according to Rawls is one that constructed upon his two
principles of justice: 1. the provision of basic rights and liberties, and 2. fair equality of
opportunity to public offices and positions, in addition to the “Difference Principle” which calls
for the establishment of the best economic arrangement for the least advantaged. Ibid., 60-65.

35

welfare and engage in crime are reflective of a perceived failure of the group to perform
civic duties.
Shelby argues that it is not reasonable 17 to expect members of DACs to fulfill
civic duties. The obligation of civic duties is predicated on citizens being treated as full
members of a liberal state. Citizens who are politically equal and receive a fair share of
opportunities and public services have the duty to reciprocate actions that maintain the
basic structure of society. Shelby argues that residents of DACs are not treated as equally
valued members of the state and are victims of an unjust social arrangement. In contrast
to communities in which members are treated as full members of the state, DACs are
subject to a dearth of job opportunities, a substandard educational system and poor public
services in general. Shelby adds that due to high housing costs and residential
discriminatory practices, most residents are unable to move to better neighborhoods with
more opportunities and better public services. Such factors restrict the ability of many
members of DACs (street-life oriented or otherwise) to fulfill civic duties. With no jobs
available or jobs that do not pay a living wage, a person is unable to fulfill the duty to
work a legal job for fair pay. A person’s ability to acquire a decent education is hindered
if they have not been adequately prepared by public schools to go to college. Finally, if
public servants such as the police do not fulfill their role as upholders of the law, this
diminishes the obligation to respect the law.
From the standpoint of many residents of DACs, the social order lacks legitimacy.
There appears to be a conspiracy to contain, exploit and underdevelop the black urban

17

I infer that Shelby employs the colloquial or lexical definition of reasonable in the
sense of “given the circumstances, rational people would make such a decision or choose such an
act.” Shelby does not provide a precising definition of the term.
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poor, to deny them equal civic standing and punish them when they refuse to
accommodate themselves to injustice.18 Shelby concludes that since DACs are not
equally benefiting from the socio-economic structure and, in fact, are being harmed by it,
they do not violate the principle of reciprocity or shirk civic obligations. It is reasonable
and justifiable for them to refuse to work low-paying menial jobs, refuse to respect the
law and refuse to go to substandard schools.
Natural duties, according to Shelby, are duties that “are unconditionally binding,
in that they hold between all persons regardless of whether they are fellow citizens or are
bound by other institutional ties.”19 In contrast to civic duties, being a member of a
liberal state is not a requirement to fulfill natural duties, nor is the obligation a matter of
choice. All human beings are obliged to perform natural duties qua moral persons. The
list of natural duties includes: do not be cruel, help the needy and vulnerable, do not
cause unnecessary suffering, respect the personhood of others, and respect one’s own
worth as a person (self-respect).20
Shelby prioritizes Rawls’s formulation of the duty of justice as a natural duty.
The Rawlsian duty of justice requires people “(1) to support and comply with just
institutions, and (2) where just institutions do not exist, to help bring them about.” 21
18

Shelby (2007), 150.

19

Shelby (2007), 144. Shelby by using Rawls’s definition of natural duties commits the
same error Rawls does. In both cases, their discussions of natural duties are not instances of
unconditional duties but conditional duties. Unconditional duties are duties one is obligated to
perform without exception. Conditional duties are duties in which exceptions to duties are
allowable depending on the context of a situation. Conditional duties can be superseded by other
contextually salient duty. See Rawls (1971), 333-342 for his definition and application of natural
duties.
20

This list is taken verbatim from Rawls (1971), 114.
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Shelby (2007), 152.
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Shelby argues that since DACs result from an unjust social arrangement, their residents
have a moral duty to combat the injustice imposed upon them and a duty not to make
their condition worse. The duty to resist injustice is concurrent with the duty of selfrespect, according to Shelby. A person who values oneself as a person has a duty to fight
conditions that diminish his or her self-worth.
In consideration of the duty of justice, Shelby calls for residents of DACs to be
cognizant of how they respond to the injustice imposed on them. The community as a
whole should build bonds of political solidarity and help the most disadvantaged when
possible. Particularly, he calls for street-life oriented people who engage in gangsterism
and hustling, for example, to perceive such lifestyles as a way to combat injustice in their
communities. Hence, gang membership ideally should be used as a means for survival
and political solidarity. Street-life oriented people should not over-identify with being a
gangster or hustler to the point that it marginalizes their duty of justice. Aspects of the
street code that advocate harming others in the community and preventing political
solidarity should be discarded, because they violate the duty of justice.
In light of Shelby’s account of natural duties, the question arises: Which types of
acts are permissible as political resistance, and how do natural duties determine whether
an act is criminal or political? Shelby argues that acts that street-life oriented people
engage in (such as stealing, shoplifting, gang membership, prostitution and selling stolen
goods) may be morally justifiable under certain conditions. He writes:
Yet fulfillment of one’s natural duties to others may nevertheless be compatible
with certain forms of crime. Taking the lives of others, except in self-defense or
in defense of others is hardly ever justified. However, taking the property of
others, especially when these others are reasonably well off, may be legitimate.
Mugging someone at gunpoint may not show sufficient respect for the victim’s
personhood, but shoplifting and other forms of theft might be justified. Given the
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hazards of participating in gang culture, recruiting children into gangs shows
insufficient concern for the weak and vulnerable; yet given the advantages of
concerted group action, participating in gangs may be a defensible and effective
means to secure needed income. There are also “victimless” crimes such as
prostitution, welfare fraud, tax evasion, selling stolen goods, and other off-thebooks transactions in the underground economy. 22
Shelby acknowledges that there are complexities he does not address that may
bear on whether the acts he lists are morally justifiable. He mentions, for example, the
issue of whether drug dealing is wrong because it harms the users. (I assume he has in
mind the argument that heroin users are addicts, and hence drug dealers are exploiting
people with an illness). However, he only briefly considers such complexities and writes,
“My goal is not to draw the precise line between permissible crimes and impermissible
ones but only to offer reasons for thinking the former set is not empty.” 23
However, grappling with these complexities is necessary in order to satisfactorily
provide a method or principle to determine which acts are reasonable and/or moral. This
is particularly important in light of the conservative behaviorist claim that the behavior of
street-life oriented people is pathological.
Shelby needs to fully explain why robbing the well-off is permissible, despite the
fact that it violates the duty to respect the personhood and property of others. He needs to
explain why prostitution is not a violation of the duty of self-respect. Shelby provides
little explanation in resolving such conflicts of duty.
Based on Shelby’s account of the duty of justice, I infer the reason why Shelby
allows some cases of crime to be morally justifiable is for the sake of self-preservation
and/or political resistance (which is encompassed in his duty of justice). Because
22

Ibid, 152.

23

Ibid, 152.
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members of DACs live in survivalist conditions of poverty and violence and are not
treated as full members of the state, it is justifiable that street-life oriented people choose
theft as a means to satisfy basic material needs (food, clothing and shelter) or gang
membership as a means to protect their property and bodily integrity and to satisfy basic
material needs.
The duty of self-preservation as a natural law has a long history in liberal thought.
It can be found in the works of classical liberal thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and John
Locke. However, its ranking as a duty is debatable. Hobbes gives primacy to selfpreservation and claims that, specifically in the state of nature (an environment in which
government is nonexistent and human beings act only according to human nature), the
only natural law that exists is self-preservation. Thus, in the state of nature, people are
rightly justified to do whatever they deem necessary to survive, including harming
innocent people.24 Locke, on the other hand, claims that even in the state of nature,
individuals have the duty to respect the life, liberty and property of others according to
natural law.25
Shelby’s use of self-preservation seems more consistent with Locke’s conception
in which self-preservation cannot violate other primary duties (such as respecting the
personhood of others). Shelby does not claim that every act for the sake of selfpreservation is justifiable. In the above quote, mugging is impermissible because it
violates the personhood of others. However, his permission of certain acts is
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See Chapter 13 in Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 74-78.
25

See Book 2, Chapter 2 of John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 269-277.
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questionable. Nonviolent theft is permissible, according to Shelby, for the sake of
satisfying basic material needs, but such an act violates the duty to respect property.
Theft also violates the duty of respecting personhood. If respecting personhood, as
Shelby understands it, entails respecting the autonomy of persons, theft diminishes a
person’s capability to use his or her property to fulfill chosen goals. Another
questionable example is allowing the sale of illegal narcotics such as heroin. The illegal
sale of heroin entails exploiting people with an addiction, thus infringing on the
personhood of others and failing to care for the vulnerable. Prostitution, in most cases, is
a desperate choice in DACs; such a choice infringes on the self-respect of the prostitute. 26
Shelby, as a deontologist, needs to clearly explain why violating certain duties is
impermissible in one case, and permissible in other cases. Even if we allow that natural
duties are conditional, Shelby needs to provide a clear principle or method to resolve the
conflicts of duty described above.
Similarly, utilizing the duty of justice does not provide a resolution. If one has a
duty to help bring about just institutions and not make unjust conditions worse, Shelby
needs to explain how theft, drug dealing, prostitution, etc. are acts of political resistance
and do not worsen the condition of DACs. Theft breeds distrust when there is known
thieves in the community. Even when the victims are “reasonably well-off,” it is
reasonable to be wary of thieves because you may potentially become a victim. 27

26

Additionally, I criticize Shelby for categorizing prostitution as a “victimless crime.” In
most cases, women choose prostitution in DACs out of desperation to fulfill basic material needs.
It is not a choice they would make under better circumstances and many feel forced into.
Therefore prostitution is not “victimless.” See Anderson (1999), 111.
27

Maybe Shelby has in mind a Robin Hood scenario to justify theft as a political act.
However, this is unrealistic. Aside from high level drug dealers, most residents are not
“reasonably well-off” and most DACs are geographically isolated from communities that would

41

Prostitution in DACs does not seem to have any social value because it perpetuates the
objectification of women. Similarly, it is not apparent what the social value of drug
dealing is in DACs. It perpetuates drug addiction and crime in some instances. (It is
common for drug users to engage in crime in order to satisfy their addictions.)
Shelby sets himself up for a historically difficult problem. Attempts to resolve
conflicting duties can be traced at least to St. Aquinas and the principle of double effect, 28
and Rawls references W.D. Ross’s prima facie duties. 29 Rawls, in fact, recognizes the
difficulty of resolving conflicting duties and thus avoids this issue. He writes, “The real
difficulty lies in their [natural duties’] more detailed specification and with questions of
priority: how are these duties to be balanced when they come into conflict, either with
each other or with obligations, and with the good that can be achieved by supererogatory
actions? There are no obvious rules for settling these questions.” 30 I will not attempt to
provide a solution either. In the next section, I argue that Shelby unnecessarily traps
have large concentrations of wealth. Victims of theft in DACs are primarily fellow residents who
are poor.
28

In Question 64, of the Summa Theologica St. Aquinas provides the principle of double
effect as a solution to conflicting duties. He argues that in the case of self-defense, for example,
one is justified in killing one’s assailant, although killing in general is sinful. It is permissible
because one does not have the intention of taking a life, but preserving one’s own. One problem
with this solution is determining what a person’s “intentions” are. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologica II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, “Of Killing”, On Law, Morality, and Politics, William P.
Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan, S.J. (eds.), (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1988), 226–7.
29

W.D. Ross provides a solution to conflicting duties according to his theory of “prima
facie duties.” Prima facie duties are a set of primary duties that can override each other
depending on the context of the situation. For example, killing in self-defense is permissible
because one’s self-preservation outweighs preserving the life of one’s assailant. However, this
solution is problematic in complex cases where it is not apparent if one duty clearly outweighs
another. Ross, W. D., The Right and the Good, ed. Philip Stratton-Lake (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
30

Rawls (1971), 339.
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himself in the dilemma of conflicting duties by conflating what is reasonable with what is
moral.
Shelby’s Conflation of Reasonable and Moral Behavior
The apparent problem of conflicting duties belies a fundamental problem with
Shelby’s method of evaluating behavior in DACs. In the cases I address, conflicts of
duty occur because Shelby conflates what is reasonable with what is moral.
Shelby clearly states, “My primary concern is to determine whether the deviant
conduct and attitudes prevalent in the ghetto are unreasonable,” (with unreasonable
italicized for emphasis by Shelby).31 However, his method for determining what is
reasonable is through using moral natural law theory. Use of such a method for every
case of ostensibly criminal behavior leads him to conflate what is reasonable with what is
moral in certain cases. I have argued that Shelby’s cases of theft, illegal drug sale and
prostitution are examples where Shelby fails to sufficiently provide moral justification,
but I concede they may be reasonable choices given the environment of DACs. Of
course, it is possible for acts to be reasonable and moral. Shelby’s argument that DACs
are not obligated to perform civic duties is a good example. If a community lacks job
opportunities, is subject to poor schooling and public services in general, it is reasonable
for residents of that community to be unemployed and undereducated and to lack respect
for government institutions. Such states, choices and attitudes are also just because (as
Shelby argues) the government fails to treat DACs as full members of the state so that
members can fulfill such civic duties.

31

Shelby (2007), 143.
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There are also cases in which acts are reasonable but immoral. American chattel
slavery is a good example. The United States needed cheap and skilled labor, and
Africans by chance were the best group able to satisfy the requirements. Slavery was a
common legal practice, and therefore the enslavement of African peoples was a
reasonable choice (at least for Europeans). However, slavery involves the infringement
on the personhood of others and is thus immoral.
Violating property rights and the personhood of others may be reasonable for the
sake of survival in DACs, but such acts are not necessarily moral. To make such a claim
conflates what is reasonable with what is moral. Elijiah Anderson concurs with my
position when he writes, “The economic unraveling in so many of these communities
puts people up against the wall and encourages them to do things that they would
otherwise be morally reluctant to do.”32 Anderson thereafter provides the example of a
young man who acknowledges that selling harmful illegal narcotics is wrong, but the
young man feels compelled to such an action because it is the best way he can conceive
of supporting himself and his family.
To be clear, the justification for why DACs are not obliged to perform civic duties
is not applicable to absolving individuals from natural duties. Shelby’s distinction
between the two duties is correct. DACs are not morally obligated to perform civic
duties because the state has not fulfilled its part in the relationship between citizen and
state. DACs are not treated as full members of the state. In the case of natural duties,
there is no requirement of reciprocation that obliges moral agents to fulfill natural duties.
Even if no one else in the community abides by natural duties, as a moral agent, one is
32

Anderson (1999), 133-134.
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obliged to fulfill such duties. Thus, although it may be reasonable to rob the reasonably
well-off, it is immoral and should not be done.
An Alternative Moral Evaluation of DACs
Aside from Shelby’s logical error, I suspect that he was motivated by the fact that
he did not want to be labeled a conservative behaviorist. Judging the behavior of some
members of DACs as immoral seems consistent with the conservative behaviorist.
However, one can condemn the criminal and immoral acts of individuals in DACs
without judging such communities as pathological. I argue that the moral responsibility
for such behavior is shared between the individual moral agent and the state. The state
has a responsibility because it is partly responsible for creating conditions where it is
practical to engage in activity that harms others and oneself. I agree with Shelby that the
unjust socio-economic arrangement in America has created and sustains an environment
that breeds socially ill behavior.
The partial blame I place on the U.S. government is supported by the work of
sociologist William Julius Wilson. He argues that the appearance of DACs is due to the
history of racism in America and a complex number of factors that arose after the Civil
Rights Movement, including a failure of government policy. The historical racial
division of labor in America created by discrimination and prejudice impacted the ability
of low-skilled, blue-collar African Americans to compete in the post-industrial labor
market of the latter 20th century. Due to segregated schooling and lack of access to white
social networks, this group was unable to obtain skills necessary to compete in the
Information Age. Thus, when changes in the economy and labor market in the seventies
appeared (such as the reduction of low-skill, blue-collar jobs in favor of information-
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processing jobs that require a higher level of education), they contributed to the high rate
of unemployment in DACs. Programs that were meant to better the condition of African
Americans such as Affirmative Action benefitted advantaged minorities prepared to
compete in the market as opposed to disadvantaged African Americans.
The continuation of exclusionary zoning practices in which federal institutions
such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) steer low-income
African Americans into DACs results in the expansion of DACs and perpetuates the
segregation of such communities.33 Additionally, exclusionary zoning practices
physically isolate DACs from other communities so that they are unable to access areas
where jobs and social networks that lead to jobs are. Lastly, the disproportionate number
of young black men given harsh penalties for nonviolent crimes results not only in the
disenfranchisement of such young men, but makes it harder for them to obtain
employment once they return to the DACs because of their status as felons. 34
In light of this history, the state has created and presently sustains a survivalist
environment in which crime is a reasonable choice. Criminal acts are immoral in most
cases, but it is reasonable when some street-life oriented people engage in certain
criminal acts. In an environment with a dearth of income opportunities and jobs that do
not provide a living wage, crime becomes attractive. The respect, money and protection
that comes with being in a gang and selling drugs, etc. is particularly appealing to young
people who are more impressionable and not adept at making life choices. Thus,
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See Marc Seitles, "The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America,”
Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law (1996).
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See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness (New York: The New Press, 2010).
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contradicting the conservative behaviorist, the code of the street does not result from
people who inherently have bad values, but is a reasonable response to an adverse
environment created by the state. Thus, the government is partly responsible for the
behavior and attitudes of street-life oriented people.
Despite my criticisms of Shelby, I am not arguing that all apparent criminal and
immoral acts are unconditional, but I allow the possibility that there are exceptions in
which theft, prostitution and selling heroin are moral. However, the permissibility for
such acts is only in the context of extreme conditions (immediate cases of life or death). I
agree, given the environment of DACs, that it is reasonable (in the sense I defined earlier)
that street-life oriented people would be compelled to engage in criminal behavior.
However, the reasonableness of such behavior does not negate the duties of personhood,
self-respect, etc. Most people in DACs do not engage in the criminal acts mentioned,
even though refusing to may require settling for a life of hardship. Theft, drug dealing,
prostitution, etc. are not the only choices for survival. They are just extremely attractive
in the context of DACs.
Only in extreme cases and as a last resort would infringing on the personhood of
others be permissible (e.g. you need to steal a drug that you cannot obtain legally in order
to save a relative who is in immediate danger of dying). I add, of course (as Shelby
does), that certain acts are always morally unjustifiable (e.g. killing a person apart from
self-defense). I do not claim to have a solution to every case of conflicting duties.
However, I believe setting the standard high, such that breaking certain moral rules must
involve immediate life or death consequences, seems to exclude many acts that would be
hard to justify, even in the case of DACs.
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Instead of providing hypothetical examples, I return to the incidents mentioned in
the first paragraph that serve as the impetus of this paper. In the case of people throwing
rocks and debris at police officers, one may argue that frequent ill treatment by police
officers reasonably justifies such a response and even possibly qualifies it a just act of
political resistance. However, it is fallacious to generalize all police officers. I assume
many of the police officers present did nothing to merit the physical abuse they were
subjected to.35 The abuse of innocent police offers infringes on the personhood of the
police officers, and, therefore, the participants of the riot should be morally condemned.
I also find that their actions were not reasonable. The frustration of the participants is
understandable. Too often, black men are subjected to police violence, and I assume the
riot was also a general response to living in DACs. However, the reasonable response
would have been to continue participating as nonviolent protesters rather than being
guided by emotion and taking out their frustration on police officers. Their actions
diminished the efficacy of the nonviolent protests and further supported the view that
such communities are pathological.
I believe the same evaluation holds for the acts of arson and destruction of
property a few days later. If government buildings were targeted, then such acts arguably
could have been deemed reasonable and just, as militant political resistance. However,
the actual destruction of property was indiscriminate. In fact, a grassroots organization
that served DACs was among the buildings vandalized. Rather than targeting buildings
with political intent, the acts of arson and vandalism seemed to be the result of random
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For the first hour of the riot the police were ordered not respond while they awaited
reinforcement. The front wave of policemen were armed with plastic shields, however there were
reports of policemen being injured by rocks, bricks and other debris.
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outbursts of anger and frustration. This makes such acts not only unreasonable but
immoral, in that they worsen the condition of DACs.
In the case of the mall looting, it is ostensibly analogous to the vandalism of the
buildings. However, upon closer investigation, there is evidence that many in the
community felt that mall merchants were exploiting customers. Residents claimed that
merchants sold goods without visible prices, often higher than retail. 36 If it is correct that
merchants of the mall were exploiting the community, and looters stole goods as a
response to exploitation, such acts may be deemed a reasonable response. Additionally,
looting in this case may be deemed just, as an act of political resistance. As long as
innocent merchants were not targeted, it is just to harm merchants financially who have
been harming the community financially for an extended time period.
I concede to Shelby that criminal acts for the sake of political resistance are
morally justifiable in some cases, but, as I have argued, common acts of criminality
found in DACs require extreme circumstances to be just. Conducting criminal acts
merely for everyday self-preservation is not sufficient to make such acts just. Shelby has
to either sufficiently prove why common acts of crime in DACs are acts of political
resistance and thus morally justifiable or choose another moral theory that clearly
justifies such acts.
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Chapter 4
Mills, Shelby, Rawls and Corrective Racial Justice
Introduction
A longstanding political issue for some African Americans is African-American
reparations in some form. However, philosophical analysis of the topic is rare. Popular
debates center on reparations for slavery, particularly on who is due compensation and
who is responsible for compensation. In this paper, I address African-American
reparations broadly, including reparations for Jim Crow, the general history of
segregation and discrimination of African Americans and the marginalization and neglect
of disadvantaged African-American communities.1 The focus of this paper is not to
justify claims for reparations indicative of the popular debate, but to analyze whether
corrective racial justice (particularly in the context of African Americans) can be
addressed sufficiently within a liberal political philosophy such as John Rawls’s
“political liberalism.”
Philosophers Tommie Shelby and Charles Mills have debated this issue,
defending and criticizing Rawls respectively. Mills argues that Rawls’s use of ideal
theory,2 reliance on distributive justice and failure to include white supremacy as a
feature of liberal philosophy prevents Rawls’s political theory from adequately

1

The first two claims I do not believe are too controversial. Reparations for
disadvantaged African-Americans communities is arguably controversial, hence I provide
justification for this claim in section six of the paper.
2

Ideal theory according to Rawls is the construction of principles of justice that are used
to develop a “perfectly just basic structure and the corresponding duties and obligations of
persons.” This contrasts with nonideal theory which is concerned with issues of justice in an
imperfect society. See John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971), 43.
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addressing corrective racial justice. As an alternative, Mills tentatively proposes
reforming political liberalism by adding principles of corrective racial justice. Shelby, in
response, concedes that political liberalism is rooted in ideal theory and does not directly
address nonideal problems such as reparations. However, he argues that Rawls’s
principles of justice function as necessary guides to doing nonideal theory. Thus,
political liberalism does not need reform.
Shelby, I argue, is too charitable to Rawls. It is not clear how Rawls’s principles
of justice guide the rectification of past injustice and how they address the rectification of
psychic harm. Additionally, Shelby erroneously conceives of reformative justice and
reparative justice as mutually exclusive categories under corrective justice. Such a
conception theoretically marginalizes disadvantaged African-American communities due
reformative and reparative justice.
Mills’s negative argument is strong but incomplete. Mills is correct that Rawls’s
theory is inadequate in application to corrective racial justice. However, Mills’s
assessment that Rawls’s omission of racial justice is a byproduct of white supremacy fails
to address the role white privilege possibly played in Rawls’s omission. Additionally, I
argue that Mills’s tentative proposal does not fully address the needs of all groups
affected by past racial injustice (e.g. black women) or the importance of cultivating
psychic social goods (e.g. respect, trust, empowerment) in communities damaged by past
racial injustice, such as disadvantaged African-American communities.
Ultimately, I propose a principle of corrective racial justice that explicitly
addresses oppression due to white male domination (including racial and gender
injustice), the cultivation of psychic social goods and the promotion of a critical narrative
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focused on the history of white supremacy. Additionally, I propose eliminating Rawls’s
requirement that representatives in his hypothetical process of deliberation should not
have knowledge of their group’s or their own existential background.
Political Liberalism
Rawls’s project in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993) is
to provide a procedure for constructing principles of justice (POJ) that free and rational
people would choose if they were in a state of equality. The selected principles are then
used to form a constitution and subsequent political institutions. In response to critics,
Rawls’s theory of justice evolves over time from A Theory of Justice to the publication of
Political Liberalism. The primary difference between the two works, according to
Rawls, is that Political Liberalism emphasizes the strictly political basis of the POJ. He
claims that although it was a feature of A Theory of Justice as well, many people
mistakenly believe his theory is based on a metaphysical conception of the person and/or
moral conception of the good. Additionally, he writes that in Political Liberalism, it is
explicit that his theory addresses the problem of constructing POJ for rational people in a
pluralistic liberal democratic society. Rawls claims that A Theory of Justice is consistent
with Political Liberalism and that the latter work serves to clarify concepts and correct
misleading statements in the former. The accuracy of his claim of consistency is the
subject of debate. However, for the sake of this paper I will be charitable to Rawls and
utilize both works as if they are consistent.
A central feature of Rawls’s theory is the “original position,” which is used as the
procedure for constructing the POJ. The original position is a hypothetical scenario in
which representatives of the various segments of society deliberate to choose the POJ. In
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order to ensure impartiality in the decision-making process, representatives are equal in
power and agree to fair terms of cooperation. Furthermore, they are constrained by the
“veil of ignorance” in which representatives are unaware of their own existential
circumstances (race, gender, class, intelligence, religious values, etc.) and the group they
represent. Most importantly, Rawls stresses that knowledge of any group’s
comprehensive views is to be excluded. A comprehensive view is any worldview that
embodies a person’s conception of the good (e.g. Christian morality, Utilitarianism, etc.).
Given the multiplicity of comprehensive views in a pluralist liberal state, the
representatives’ knowledge of any group’s comprehensive view compromises impartial
deliberations and therefore jeopardizes justification of the principles to the public at the
end of the process. Ultimately, the original position is intended to construct POJ that
(once made public) any reasonable liberal person 3 would accept because he or she would
find that the POJ are embedded in or not in conflict with his or her own comprehensive
view.
The two POJ that result from the original position are: 1) the provision of basic
rights and liberties and 2) fair equality of opportunity to public offices and positions
(FEO), in addition to the “Difference Principle” which calls for the establishment of the
best economic arrangement for the least advantaged. 4 Rawls states that the first principle

3

Ibid., 48-54. “Reasonable persons” for Rawls refers to people who recognize that for
the sake of the ends of society at large, they must consider the ends of other citizens (ends which
may sometimes conflict with one’s own).
4

Both fair equality of opportunities and offices, and the Difference Principle are
conceived as necessary conditions that must be satisfied in light of social and economic
inequality. Specifically concerning the Difference Principle, Rawls argues that for the sake of a
fair distribution of primary social goods (things any rational person is presumed to want) such as
income and wealth, inequality of such goods is only allowable if the basic structure of society is
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is lexically prior to the second principle, and FEO is lexically prior to the Difference
Principle.5 The principles are intended to serve as guides for forming a constitution,
political institutions and laws in a “well-ordered society” (a fully reasonable [in his sense
of the term], democratic society regulated by a public political conception of justice).
Ultimately, Rawls seeks to provide a theoretical framework for an ideal liberal
democratic state that serves as a model for reforming existing liberal democratic states.
He does not consider his project utopian; the POJ reflect the values shared by reasonable
liberal persons in the context of contemporary liberal democratic societies.
The Debate (Part 1): Shelby in Defense of Rawls
Since the publication of A Theory of Justice, Rawls’s political theory has been
subjected to various criticisms. Political philosopher Charles Mills follows a line of
criticism begun by feminist philosophers who argue that liberal political philosophy, in
general, is reflective of male thought, ignores the relevance of male dominance in doing
political philosophy and marginalizes issues of justice relevant to women. 6 Mills argues
that liberal political philosophy traditionally ignores or minimizes the role of white
supremacy7 in doing political philosophy and marginalizes issues of justice relevant to

such that individuals who are disadvantaged in talents (due to birth and/or social circumstances)
benefit better than any alternative.
5

Ibid., 43. Rawls defines “lexically prior” in the following: “This is an order which
requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before we can move on to the second, the
second before we consider the third, and so on. A principle does not come into play until those
previous to it are either fully me or do not apply…those earlier in the ordering have an absolute
weight, so to speak, with respect to later ones, and hold without exception.
6

Mills writes, for example, in his text the The Racial Contract that the text is influenced
by Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract and other feminist writers.
7

Mills’s definition of white supremacy is that it is a “political system, a particular power
structure of formal and informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential
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nonwhites. In recent years, Mills has focused his criticisms on Rawls and Rawlsians such
as Tommie Shelby.
Mills argues that embedded in liberal political theory is a social ontology that
abstracts away from the oppressive and exploitative relations nonwhites have been
subjected to as a result of white supremacy. For example, traditionally liberal political
philosophers defend the right to life, liberty and property and the equality of human
beings. However, coextensive with the historical development of such concepts and
values is the denial of their application to nonwhites 8—a fact which, Mills argues, should
be an essential part of the liberal narrative. Ultimately, the failure to include white
supremacy in contemporary liberal political theory results in the perpetuation of
excluding the interests and experiences of nonwhites.
According to Mills, Rawls is a prime perpetrator of such exclusion. The
idealization of social and political society indicative of Rawls’s well-ordered society is an
example of a methodological failure to adequately address racial oppression in actual
nonideal societies. Racism does not exist and a history of racism is irrelevant in the wellordered society because political institutions and citizens are just. Given such theoretical
conditions, there is no space to address political issues such as corrective racial justice.
Mills thus concludes that Rawls’s self-imposed confinement to ideal theory and his use of
hypothesis are “a double evasion, and that the ghost of the ostensibly repudiated factual

distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties.” Charles
Mills, The Racial Contract ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 3.
8

Specifically, Mills references classical social contract theorists such as Locke, Kant and
Rousseau in The Racial Contract.
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dimension of contractarianism continues to haunt the normative account, as manifested
precisely in this silence on racial justice.” 9
In response to Rawls’s critics (including Mills), political philosopher Tommie
Shelby, in his article “Race and Ethnicity, Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian
Considerations,” defends Rawls against the claim that political liberalism is incapable of
addressing racial justice. Shelby acknowledges the paucity of remarks concerning race in
Rawls’s works and that Rawls’s well-ordered society does not address racial corrective
justice, since injustice is not present in such a society. He concedes that Mills’s criticism
of classical liberal philosophers (such as Locke and Kant) should be taken seriously and
discussed among philosophers. However, Shelby argues that Rawls is not subject to such
criticism.
Shelby argues that fundamental features of political liberalism prohibit racial
discrimination and oppression. For example, the veil of ignorance prevents the
possibility of bias (racial or otherwise) that representatives could use in their deliberation
of the POJ. If representatives do not have knowledge of their group’s race and act
according to the values of fairness and reciprocity, the representatives will choose POJ
that prohibit the creation of institutional racism. Continuing, Shelby argues that Rawls’s
constraint of universality requires that the POJ apply equally to everyone by virtue of
being moral persons. Moral persons have two moral powers, according to Rawls: 1)
They are capable of having a conception of the good and 2) have a sense of justice that
includes a desire to act upon and apply the POJ, at least minimally. Rawls explicitly
states that race is irrelevant to possessing these characteristics: “There is no race or
9
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recognized group of human beings that lacks this attribute [sense of justice].” 10
Therefore, Shelby concludes that discrimination against nonwhites is inconsistent with
Rawls’s conditions in the original position.
Shelby finally argues that racial discrimination is inconsistent with fundamental
liberal ideas that inform Rawls’s conception of justice and conception of moral persons.
Equality, fairness and cooperation, which are valued by representatives in the original
position, originate from the “public political culture” of a liberal state, according to
Rawls. The public political culture is comprised of “liberal democratic political
institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of interpretation, and
public historic liberal documents and texts.”11 In response to the argument that
traditionally the public political culture of America has a racist subtext, Shelby replies
that Rawls conceives of the public political culture as being informed by a shared
contemporary interpretation of fundamental liberal ideas and principles. Thus, though
some of the founding fathers were racist, and past political documents institutionalized
racism, the contemporary understanding of liberal values and justice excludes racist
ideology as part of the present public political culture.

10

The following is an extended quote in which Rawls claims that even in cases where
people have less than optimal capacity to be a moral person, they should not be denied justice.
“When someone lacks the requisite potentiality either from birth or accident, this is regarded as a
defect or deprivation. There is no race or recognized group of human beings that lacks this
attribute. Only scattered individuals are without this capacity, or its realization to the minimum
degree, and the failure to realize it is the consequence of unjust and impoverished social
circumstances, or fortuitous contingencies. Furthermore, while individuals presumably have
varying capacities for a sense of justice, this fact is not a reason for depriving those with a lesser
capacity of the full protection of justice.” Rawls (1971), 506.
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In response to the debate of whether Rawls is capable of addressing racial justice
in toto (preventative and corrective), Shelby begins by arguing that once the stage of
constructing a constitution has been reached, the veil of ignorance is partially lifted, and
representatives have access to the general facts about the society they are reforming.
They are aware of the size, economy, institutional structure and social positions, for
example. Shelby postulates that, additionally, one of the general facts revealed is
whether the society entails racial conflict, racist beliefs and/or racial oppression. He
concludes that if such facts are true, then the representatives create a constitution that
prohibits the institutionalization of racial discrimination. I read this argument as
primarily pertaining to preventative measures against racial injustice.
Shelby’s second argument indirectly addresses corrective racial justice. Relying
on FEO to addresses the economic inequality among African Americans as a group, he
writes:
In this way, the fair equality of opportunity principle addresses one of the most
urgent concerns of members of the least favored races, namely, to insure that their
life prospects are not unfairly diminished by the economic inequalities that have
been created by a history of racism. Were this principle institutionally realized
and widely recognized, it might also have the effect of sharply reducing the
resentment for past racial injustice that some members of disadvantaged racial
groups harbor, maybe even leading them to reconsider their insistence on claims
to reparations.12
Shelby is optimistic that creating a basic structure of society that ensures fair
equality of opportunities would eliminate the cumulative material harm done to African
Americans. Although he carefully avoids stating that FEO rectifies past harm, it can be
inferred that Shelby concludes that a potential byproduct of relieving present material
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harm is the rectification of past harm. Additionally, Shelby seems to minimize the
importance of addressing past psychological harm, which is expressed in the resentment
some African Americans harbor. Lastly, one could read his statement about claims to
reparations as almost dismissive.13 This quote in particular serves as fodder for Mills’s
critique of Shelby.
The Debate (Part 2): Mills’s Response to Shelby
In “Retrieving Rawls for Racial Justice?: A Critique of Tommie Shelby,” Mills
provides four criticisms of Shelby:
1. Shelby’s use of FEO to address corrective justice is inconsistent with what
Rawls writes in A Theory of Justice.
2. Shelby makes a category mistake in his application of FEO to corrective
justice.
3. Shelby conflates distributive justice with corrective justice.
4. Shelby’s use of FEO in application to corrective justice does not adhere to the
lexical priority of the first principle of justice before the second principle of
justice.
Despite Mills’s criticism that Rawls perpetuates white supremacy, Mills concedes
that Rawls recognizes the inadequacy of applying ideal theory to problems within
nonideal theory. Furthermore, Rawls is aware that the POJ may be inadequate
concerning matters of racial justice. Mills cites the following quotes from Rawls:
The principles and their lexical order were not acknowledged with these situations
in mind (unjust institutions) and so it is possible that they no longer hold. I shall
not attempt to give a systematic answer to these questions… The intuitive idea is
to split the theory of justice into two parts. The first or ideal part assumes strict
compliance. . . My main concern is with this part of the theory. Nonideal theory,
the second part, is worked out after an ideal conception of justice has been
chosen; only then do the parties ask which principles to adopt under less happy
13
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conditions. . . . The conception of justice as fairness does not directly apply to
[these issues].14
Among our most basic problems are those of race, ethnicity, and gender. These
may seem of an altogether different character calling for different principles of
justice, which Theory does not discuss.15
To conclude, when used in a certain way, distinctions of gender and race give rise
to further relevant positions to which a special form of the difference principle
applies.16
From passages such as these, Mills argues that there is enough textual evidence to
support the claim that Rawls advocates the construction of a special POJ or a special
application of the Difference Principle to address racial justice. Thus, Shelby’s
application of FEO to address racial injustice is untenable.
Mills’s second criticism of Shelby is that Shelby commits one of two category
mistakes. Shelby’s advocacy of FEO reveals that he does not sufficiently consider the
distinction between ideal theory and nonideal theory. Mills writes that Shelby believes
“either that non-ideal theory just involves populating the terms of ideal theory with
different variables, or that you can preempt the need for non-ideal theory altogether by
appropriately extrapolating ideal theory.”17 Mills does not provide much detail in support
of this argument. However, based on later statements in the article, it can be inferred that
the first category mistake essentially entails replacing terms in the second POJ such as
“economic justice” with “corrective racial justice.” The category mistake in this case is
14
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that corrective racial justice, according to Mills, is not equivalent to or subsumed under
the category of economic justice. The second category mistake seems to refer to the
position that the exclusion of social and economic injustice in the basic structure
automatically corrects racial injustice, and, thus, nonideal theory is unnecessary.
Associated with the criticism that Shelby fails to distinguish ideal theory from
nonideal theory is Mills’s criticism that Shelby conflates distributive justice with
corrective justice. Distributive justice focuses on principles aimed at the distribution of
goods, while corrective justice is concerned with principles for the rectification of past
harm. In Rawls’s framework, the former is implemented within ideal theory, while the
latter is implemented within nonideal theory. Mills argues that distributive justice in
political liberalism is implemented as a preemptive measure to prevent the appearance of
racial injustice in a well-ordered society. It is not meant to correct past injustice.
Secondly, distributive justice is insufficient to fully address the demands of AfricanAmerican reparationists. Advocates for African-American reparations demand acts by
the state that extend beyond the distribution of goods such as wealth, public services and
job opportunities. Acts such as an apology, recognition of wrongdoing and a restoration
of civic trust are essential components of African-American reparations as well. In
section three, I argue that distributive justice is incapable of fully addressing the
restoration of psychic social goods in disadvantaged African-American communities.
Psychic social goods include intracommunal trust, respect and empowerment. Mills
similarly is concerned with addressing such intangible harms as a part of any successful
program for African-American reparations.
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Mills writes that Shelby “jumbles two types of wrongs” by conflating distributive
justice with corrective justice. FEO is meant to fairly distribute offices and opportunities
in light of class disadvantage. According to Mills, racial injustice is not categorically a
violation of a just economic arrangement, but a refusal to respect equal personhood. In
the case of class disadvantage, the white male working class is not oppressed by
antiliberal laws and social discrimination akin to African Americans. Economic
disadvantage for white males arises from the workings of a capitalist market that allows
white males to compete, but results in economic hardship for those who do poorly in
market competition. This contrasts with racial disadvantage in which African Americans
are denied an equal chance to compete in the market due to discrimination, segregation,
etc. Mills sums up his point by stating that “bad luck in the social lottery is different
from being on a lower rung because of social oppression that denies equal personhood.” 18
Racism is fundamentally the denial of equal personhood, and thus FEO and its use of
distributive justice is inadequate to address such issues. Rather, the denial of personhood
is a violation of due rights and liberties granted to all citizens as persons. This point sets
up Mills’s last criticism that racial injustice is fundamentally a violation of the first POJ
rather than FEO.
Mills reminds readers that the relationship between the two POJ is such that the
first principle is lexically prior to the second. Before the establishment of FEO, citizens
must first have basic rights and liberties. Therefore, if corrective racial justice is a
problem of basic liberties and rights, it has to be addressed within the context of the first
principle rather than FEO. Mills asserts that one cannot have a well-ordered society
18
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without addressing the history of structural white domination. To make possible a fair
economic arrangement for all, first the illegitimate inequality of property between races
(a violation of basic rights and liberties) must be rectified. Mills writes:
For reparations advocates, existing property distributions are illegitimate because
they rest on a history of racial discrimination and its cumulative intergenerational
result over decades, or centuries if you go back to slavery, which violated the BL
[basic rights and liberties] rights of blacks…the correction of BL violations would
seem to need to be dealt with fist, even before we get to the question of the
applicability of FEO.19
Mills’s criticism, of course, assumes only for the sake of argument that the first
POJ is a factor in addressing corrective justice. However, given his previous criticisms
that the POJ are only forward-looking and not designed to address past harm and cannot
address certain types of state action (an apology, repairing trust, etc.), the first POJ alone
is inadequate to address corrective racial injustice.
The Debate (Part 3): Shelby in Response to Mills
In response to Mills’s criticisms, Shelby, in “Racial Realities and Corrective
Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills,” replies to Mill on three fronts:
1. Shelby denies that Rawls ignores racial injustice and does not have a method
for addressing it in political liberalism.
2. Shelby denies that he (Shelby) does not give weight to the ideal
theory/nonideal theory distinction.
3. Shelby denies that he (Shelby) proposed the use of FEO to address racial
corrective justice and thus conflates distributive justice with corrective justice.
Reiterating his argument in the Fordham Review, Shelby writes that Rawls cannot
be accused of obscuring white supremacy akin to classical social contract theorists. Ideal
theory serves to provide a reasonable standard to judge when social arrangements are
19
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unjust. Political liberalism indirectly considers the historical and current reality of racial
injustice in the process of reaching a “reflective equilibrium.” In political liberalism,
reflective equilibrium is the state in which the POJ are in accord with reasonable liberal
citizens’ convictions about political justice. At the last stage, in which the POJ are
publicly known, the attainment of a reflective equilibrium serves as a sign of public
acceptance and justification. Hence, if the POJ do not condemn slavery, racial
segregation and racial discrimination, reasonable liberal persons would reject such POJ,
and the POJ would require revision.
However, Shelby surmises that Mills actually does not believe that Rawls’s theory
is incapable of addressing ongoing racial injustice. The heart of Mills’s critique is
whether political liberalism can address corrective racial justice. Shelby reiterates that
unfortunately Rawls does not provide much insight into corrective racial justice because
political liberalism is rooted in ideal theory. However, Shelby does not view the
omission of such discussion as harming Rawls’s theory. Corrective justice as a category
of nonideal theory entails not only addressing past harm but present harm. Shelby points
out that his (Shelby’s) own work in corrective racial justice focuses on deriving
principles for revolution and reform to address current racial injustice. Hence, Shelby’s
work focuses on forward-looking principles aimed at altering the existing basic structure
to bring about Rawls’s well-ordered society. Mills, on the other hand, seeks principles of
rectification to make amends to victims of past injustice. Rawls does not ignore
rectification, but the use of ideal theory is more in accord with reforming the existing
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basic structure. Shelby’s sentiment throughout the article is that reform and revolution
for African-American equality are more important than reparations. 20
In agreement with Mills’s textual analysis of Rawls, Shelby writes that the POJ
serve only as a guide to doing nonideal theory and thus should not be construed as direct
principles of corrective justice. He surmises that additional precepts of justice may be
needed. Ideal theory only provides the standard for when rectification is needed.
In reply I would note that serving as a guide for nonideal theory is not the same as
serving as a set of axioms from which theorems of rectification can be directly
deduced. I doubt that ideal theory could play this latter justificatory role. And it
should not surprise us if auxiliary precepts of justice were required for a fully
adequate theory of compensatory justice.21
This recognition of the limits of ideal theory and the proposal of additional
precepts of justice serve as Shelby’s response to Mills’s criticism that Shelby does not
sufficiently give weight to the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory. Essentially,
Shelby claims that Mills misreads his argument. Furthermore, Shelby claims that Mills is
too dismissive of the importance of ideal theory. Shelby argues that in order to determine
how to evaluate particular instances of injustice (falling in the category of nonideal
theory), the general standards of justice (found in ideal theory) must be available. Before
we are capable of evaluating particular instances of injustice, we first must know what
criteria are used to determine what is unjust. Hence, equal liberty embodied in the first
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POJ explains what is wrong with Jim Crow Laws. An infringement on liberty can be
used as a basis for claims of rectification.
In response to Mills’s argument that FEO is inapplicable to corrective justice and
that Shelby conflates distributive justice with corrective justice, Shelby states once again
that Mills misreads his (Shelby’s) argument. The quotes Mills cites pertain only to an
existing, unjust, racialized class structure, which FEO and the Difference Principle
directly address. They do not pertain to correcting past racial injustice. Shelby states that
his intent is to point out that in some cases, racial injustice creates socio-economic
inequality and FEO can be utilized to address such problems. He did not intend to
address the issue of reparations. He only hypothesizes that the amelioration of economic
inequality may reduce resentment for past harm, but not necessarily eliminate it.
Assessment (Part 1): Understanding Rawls from the Basis of White Privilege
Mills’s critique that historically liberal political philosophy masks white
supremacy in its promotion of liberal values and marginalizes the experience of
nonwhites has argumentative strength. Mills, in The Racial Contract, and other
philosophers such as Robert Bernasconi and Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze argue that
classical social contract theorists such as Kant and Locke advocate liberal rights (freedom
to life, equal treatment under law, etc.) yet exclude nonwhites from the enjoyment of
such rights.22 Mills concedes that Rawls does not advocate white supremacy; however
through the omission of racial justice and the methodological confinement to nonideal
22
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theory, Rawls perpetuates white supremacy (as Mills defines the term) by marginalizing
the experience and concerns of nonwhites.
Upon reflection of Mills’s argument, I disagree with Shelby’s claim that Rawls
should be completely exonerated from such judgment. Shelby argues that Rawls
recognizes the limitations of ideal theory, and that the POJ as fundamental principles
serve as a necessary guide to doing nonideal theory. Essentially, Shelby argues that for
the sake of Rawls’s project, Rawls does not directly address racial justice. However,
Rawls is concerned with racial justice and has the theoretical tools that serve as a guide to
addressing it.
Shelby’s first argument that the project of political liberalism prohibits Rawls
from addressing nonideal matters of justice is not convincing. Rawls could have chosen
to write articles on nonideal theory while refining his ideal theory. Furthermore, as Mills
points out, Rawls did not live in a bubble. He wrote A Theory of Justice during a time of
palpable racial tension. Particularly during the seventies and eighties when Rawls writes
several articles in response to his critics, he could have chosen to write articles addressing
racial injustice.
An indicator of Rawls’s indifference to writing on topics he has no interest in is
shown in his failure to respond to feminist critics of his work. Not until the 1990s does
Rawls respond to the multiple feminist critiques of his theory that began in the
seventies.23 Rawls not only chose to confine his work to ideal theory, but chose to
respond to articles situated in ideal theory throughout much of his career. Given that it
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took him 20 years to address issues of gender justice, it is not surprising that he did not
write about racial justice.
However, although I agree that Rawls’s scholarly choices marginalize the
experiences of nonwhites and perpetuate a tradition of exclusion within philosophy, I
disagree with Mills’s simple characterization of Rawls as perpetuating the white
supremacy of his philosophical forefathers. Rawls’s omission of racial justice is better
understood as an instance of white privilege. Possibly, Rawls is ignorant of the necessity
of addressing racial justice and of the consideration that he has a particular duty to
address it in his work.
Mills’s characterization of Rawls as perpetuating white supremacy akin to social
contract theorists is misleading. Although Mills includes marginalization in his definition
of white supremacy, it can be inferred from Mills’s statements that Rawls is in the same
category as Kant and Locke. Even if Rawls, Locke and Kant all marginalize nonwhites
in their work, Kant and Locke do so from an ontological foundation of supposed white
superiority. Mills concedes that this is not a characteristic of Rawls and that political
liberalism condemns explicit racism. Mills’s comparison between Rawls and classical
social contract theorists serves only to clarify the historical tradition that links Rawls’s
omission to his predecessors and the history of marginalization, but it does not explain
the immediate origin of Rawls’s marginalizing.
What is absent from Mills’s criticism is the argument that Rawls’s
marginalization is the result of contemporary white privilege. I define white privilege as
a set of advantages whites benefit from (exclusive to nonwhites) as a result of white
supremacy past and present. A characteristic of white privilege is that whites may be
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unaware that they possess white privilege and that their actions unknowingly perpetuate
white supremacy (in Mills’s sense of the term).
Shannon Sullivan, in Revealing Whiteness, argues that white privilege operates as
an unconscious habit. She defines a habit as “an organism’s subconscious predisposition
to transact with its physical, social, political and natural worlds in particular ways.” 24 In
her conception, habits constitute a person’s character and therefore constitute the self
ontologically. Additionally, habits can be understood as a way one operates in the world;
thus, they are environmentally constituted. Habits of race, gender, class, language, etc.
all intersect to constitute the self.
According to Sullivan, even though a person may act on habits unconsciously and
not intend a resulting harm, it does not mean harmful acts are excusable. Sullivan does
not develop this point of blameworthiness further, but it can be argued that because habits
are not fixed, and one can become conscious of his or her habits, moral condemnation is
allowable when someone does harm based on an unconscious habit. In the case of
Rawls, it can be inferred from Mills that Rawls is blameworthy of marginalization
because, as an acclaimed scholar whose work focuses on justice, “he should have known
better.” He should have been aware that the deliberate choice to omit discussion of racial
justice minimizes the importance of a salient issue in the context of the United States.
The argument that Rawls fell victim to the sway of the culture of professional philosophy
is not cogent, according to Mills.
Mills acknowledges that Rawls’s omission of racial justice can be partly
understood as a manifestation of a general problem of culture in the field of philosophy.
24
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The lack of interest in writing about race and the experience of nonwhites is enculturated
through the types of articles and books published, conference themes, debates among
philosophers, employment opportunities and classes taught. It is reasonable to assume
that Rawls was subject to this enculturation as others in the profession.
Any elementary sociology of belief would tell us that the demography of the
profession (overwhelmingly white) will itself be an obvious major causal factor,
group membership in the privileged race tendentially producing certain distinctive
interests (uninterests), priorities (marginalities), and concerns (indifferences). But
apart from this major extra-ideational factor, I suggest that there is a key internal
conceptual factor as well: Rawls’s methodological decision to focus in A Theory
of Justice on “ideal theory”—the reconstruction of what a perfectly just society
would look like.25
However, Mills argues that Rawls is deliberate in his omission of racial justice.
Rawls is aware of the relevance of racial justice to his theory. What seems not to have
been impressed upon him is that racial justice is important enough to necessitate
scholarly work on his part. This transgression is better understood in the context of white
privilege than the racism of Locke and Kant. Kant and Locke’s transgressions result
from conscious racism, while Rawls’s transgression is maybe one of ignorance. The idea
that philosophical issues of nonwhites need prioritization may have never seriously
crossed his mind to compel him to address it substantively, because he was in the habit of
not considering the interest of nonwhites. This is similar to his failure to address feminist
philosophical critics for 20 years (which we can say is a manifestation of white male
privilege).
Although my argument about categorizing Rawls’s omission as an instance of
white privilege is a criticism of Mills, it is consistent with Mills’s concept of the
epistemology of ignorance. Mills describes the epistemology of ignorance as a “localized
25
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and global cognitive dysfunction” in which white people are ignorant of the racialized
and racist world they live in.26 This is accomplished through systematic
“misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters of race” in
order to maintain white power. 27 Although Mills does not use the term white privilege,
his description of the epistemology of ignorance is consistent with Sullivan’s discussion
of the foundation of white privilege. (She in fact references Mill’s epistemology of
ignorance on her notes page.)
Assessment (Part 2): Reformative and Rectificatory Justice in Respect to
Disadvantaged African-American Communities
What I find particularly problematic about Shelby’s response to Mills is that
Shelby’s exclusive categorization of reform and revolution versus rectification is invalid
in certain cases, such as that of disadvantaged African-American communities (hereafter
referred to as DACs). Additionally, Shelby is too dismissive of the importance of
reparations in relation to DACs.
Shelby states that his work focuses on reformative and revolutionary justice,
which is distinct from rectificatory justice (which includes reparations). Under Shelby’s
categorization, principles of reform and revolution and principles of reparation constitute
a full theory of corrective justice. However, the two principles and their aims are distinct.
Indeed, we can view the principles of reform and revolution [Type 1] and the
principles of rectification [Type 2] as jointly constituting a theory of corrective
justice. Principles of type (1) have to do with altering the basic structure of a
society so that it better approximates a well-ordered society. Type (2) principles
address the need to make amends to those burdened and harmed by unjust basic
structures. Type (1) principles are forward looking, oriented toward establishing
26
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a just society. Type (2) principles are backward looking, oriented toward settling
unpaid moral debts. To see that (1) and (2) are distinct it is enough to observe
that one could fully pay reparations to the victims of past racial justice and yet
their society remain unjust, including racially unjust. 28
After establishing his taxonomy of nonideal principles (which includes penal
principles and principles for political ethics), Shelby argues that Mills’s criticism that he
(Shelby) conflates distributive justice with corrective justice is unsound. Mills
erroneously assumes that Shelby’s comments apply to rectificatory justice when they
actually apply to reform and revolution.
Shelby’s reply is not too contentious; however, Shelby further adds that matters of
African-American rectificatory justice are less important than the project of reform and
revolution.
If my argument is sound, then material reparations for past racial injustice should
be regarded as less central to the project of corrective racial justice than Mills
assumes… The fundamental normative question for the members of historically
oppressed groups still living in the midst of societal injustice should not be “Are
we due reparations for our injuries” but “What kind of society would merit our
allegiance and is therefore worth fighting for?”29
One can infer from Shelby’s devaluation of African-American reparations and the
division between reformative/revolutionary justice versus rectificatory justice that the
two types of justice are not interdependent in some cases. Additionally, Shelby’s reply
ignores Mills’s concern for nonmaterial aspects of reparations, such as the need for an
apology, acknowledgement of wrongdoing and rectification of psychic harm. In
particular, DACs are due any rectificatory justice given to African Americans in general,
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but they also have their own specific claims to rectificatory and reformative justice
(which include psychic harm).
Disadvantaged African-American communities are particularly due reparations
due to neglect on behalf of the U.S. government. The attempt to integrate African
Americans through Affirmative Action, for example, benefited primarily advantaged
African Americans. African Americans who were educated, rooted in the middle class,
intellectually gifted and/or had access to strong socio-economic networks were able to
take advantage of opportunities Affirmative Action provided. Those without such
advantages and skills were unable to effectively compete in the burgeoning Information
Age and thus were essentially marginalized from the market. Coupled with poor public
education and nongovernmental factors (such as the exodus of the black middle class
from traditional black communities), an environment of poverty and unemployment was
created, accompanied by crime and drug abuse.30
Additionally, living in conditions in which some residents struggled to satisfy
basic material needs led some residents to form a “street code” in which disrespect,
distrust and disempowerment are believed to be justifiable for the sake of survival. This
accounts for high rates of theft, murder, violence and uncivil attitudes and behaviors of
some people in DACs.31 The harmful aspects of the street code and its effects on the
immediate community constitute part of what I call psychic harm. These intracommunal
forms of psychic harm are exacerbated by outside institutional forces such as the police
30

See William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1987) for a full argument and statistical data pertaining to the genesis of
disadvantage African-American communities.
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and welfare agencies. Police harassment and violence, paternalistic treatment by welfare
agencies and inadequate public schooling reinforce distrust, disrespect and
disempowerment among residents in various forms, in addition to fostering a distrust of
government institutions. Given that such harms currently exist, DACs are also due
corrective justice in the form of Shelby’s reformative/revolutionary justice.
Corrective racial justice for DACs demands not only an apology for the historical
discrimination and oppression of African Americans in general, but for the current
neglect, oppression and isolation of DACs due to the failure of integrationist policies. In
light of extreme poverty and lack of employment opportunities and public services, there
is an urgent need for the distribution of economic opportunities and resources to such
communities in particular. Furthermore, the cultivation of trust, respect and
empowerment in DACs requires the large-scale support of grassroots organizations
within such communities and a radical transformation of the culture and practices of
government institutions which tend to treat DACs antagonistically and/or
paternalistically.32
Particularly in the case of repairing psychic social goods, reform/revolution and
repair are interdependent. For example, in order to cultivate intracommunal trust and
32

The national debate about police culture and DACs is focused on the antagonistic
relationship police have with residents of DACs, particularly black men. The deaths of Freddie
Gray in Baltimore, MD and Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO are commonly referenced. In Julie
Anne White, Democracy, Justice and the Welfare State: Reconstructing Public Care (University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000) White argues that the inefficiency of state social
service agencies is due to the paternalistic relationship welfare providers have with clients in
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results in clients being noncooperative, and providers being unable to effectively serve clients.
Instead of treating clients paternalistically, White argues that welfare workers should perceive
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power with providers over policies and programs that affect clients.
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trust in public institutions, it is prudent to include an acknowledgment of wrongdoing and
apology in addition to the provision of adequate public services and economic
opportunities. Appropriating Shelby’s example, it is conceivable that the provision of
adequate public services and economic opportunities alone would be insufficient to
establish trust in government institutions or communal trust. In light of the long history
of oppression, such measures might be viewed with skepticism. Without
acknowledgment of wrongdoing and an apology, residents may be skeptical whether their
well-being is being considered or there is some other motive. Of course, it is possible
that even with an acknowledgment of wrongdoing or apology, the same result may
appear, but it is reasonable to think that admittance of wrongdoing and an apology are
essential components of establishing trust when it has been broken.
Another source of Shelby’s oversight is that he views reparative justice within the
context of distributive justice. In a discussion of reparative justice, he equates it to
compensatory justice: “I do not view FEO as a principle of rectification (i.e. as a matter
of compensatory justice) contrary to what Mills says.” 33 Hence, under such a category,
reparations only apply to the distribution of money and tangible resources for welfare and
educational and economic opportunities, which is insufficient to cultivate intangible
psychic social goods.
My criticisms of Shelby are important in the application of political liberalism due
to Rawls’s requirement that the POJ must be publicly justifiable and affirmed. Citizens
in a well-ordered society share liberal values in order for them to ultimately affirm the
POJ. Reasonable liberal persons, according to Rawls, share liberal values such as
33
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respecting the rights of citizens and being civil and cooperative for the sake of
maintaining a just society. Ideally, when the POJ are publicly revealed, the justness and
political utility of the POJ are recognized and affirmed by reasonable citizens. However,
if reasonable citizens feel that they are not respected as equal citizens because past
injustice has not been rectified, they may be skeptical of the POJ and reject the principles.
This would thwart the political justification of the POJ as just and prevent the consensus
Rawls seeks.
Furthermore, Rawls conceives of reasonable citizens as sharing certain psychic
social goods in order to effectively function in a well-ordered society. Specifically,
Rawls discusses the good of self-respect. Rawls defines self-respect as having
confidence in one’s abilities and valuing one’s life plan. Rawls writes that, arguably,
self-respect is the most important good because if a person does not have self-respect, he
or she is incapable of pursuing a life plan.
Without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we
lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes empty and vain,
and we sink into apathy and cynicism. Therefore the parties in the original
position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that
undermine self-respect. 34
In this quote, Rawls is not directly addressing the political import of self-respect
as much as its import to the well-being of citizens. This is consistent with Rawls as a
liberal thinker. Most liberal political thinkers prioritize providing conditions so that
citizens can exercise their autonomy. Without self-respect, the robust exercise of
autonomy is not possible. The same argument can be made in relation to trust and
empowerment. The absences of both limit the person’s ability to use his or her
34
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autonomy. If I do not trust people in my community, I am hesitant about performing
daily life activities (going to the local store, talking to neighbors, etc.). If I feel
disempowered (due to living in abject poverty, the unavailability of jobs and/or fear of
safety, for example), it is reasonable that I may adopt a nihilistic attitude toward life to
the point that I feel that pursuing any life plans is worthless. For these very reasons,
cultivating trust, respect and empowerment in DACs is an important feature of corrective
racial justice for such communities.
Reforming Political Liberalism
Despite a body of work dedicated to critiquing Rawls and advocating reform,
Mills has never officially published a proposal for reforming Rawls. However, in at least
one talk he has provided a tentative proposal for reform. 35 Although liberal values have
historically only been fully applicable to white males, Mills acknowledges their worth.
In consideration of the history of white supremacy and its effects on nonwhites, Mills
proposes adding a new original position to specifically construct principles of racial
justice. Rawls’s existing original position and POJ remain, but they only pertain to
creating an ideal basic structure. Mills’s nonideal original position serves to construct
principles of “rectificatory racial justice to dismantle a racialized basic structure.” 36
Mills’s original position maintains the veil of ignorance with certain caveats. It remains
the case that representatives do not have knowledge of their own or their group’s
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background information. However, representatives are aware that they are creating
principles for a society shaped by white supremacy.
Tentatively, Mills proposes three principles of corrective racial justice guided by
Rawls’s ideal POJ. Mills does not state how Rawls’s POJ “guide” the construction of
principles of corrective racial justice. However, in light of Mills’s chart below, it can be
inferred that each of Mills’s nonideal POJ is informed by a specific ideal POJ or the
primary social good of self-respect.37
PD 1, PD2

PR 1, PR 2, PR 3

Principles of ideal distributive justice to construct an
ideal basic structure

Principles of ideal rectificatory
racial justice to dismantle a
racialized basic structure

PD 1 (equal liberties principle) →

PR 1 → end racially unequal
citizenship

Regulates ethico-juridicial primary goods (one’s
equal citizenship)

PD 2 (fair opportunity and difference principle) → PR 2 → end racial exploitation
Regulates material primary social goods (one’s place
in the socio-economic system)
SELF-RESPECT as a primary social good →
underwritten by PD1 and PD2

PR 3 → end racial disrespect

The chart indicates that the provision of basic liberties serves as a basis for a
nonideal principle of ending racially unequal citizenship. He defines racially unequal
citizenship as a case in which “people of color are treated as noncitizens or second-class
37

Note that the chart below is taken from Mills’s handout at the 2008 Spindel
Conference. Additionally, note that Rawls defines primary goods as “things that every rational
man is presumed to want” Rawls (1971), 62. Primary goods include natural goods such as
intelligence, health and imagination. Primary social goods include income, wealth, rights and
liberties (things the basic political structure can control.) He talks at length about self-respect as
arguable the most important primary social good in part three of Theory of Justice.
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citizens, without equal political input into the governing process or equal status in
everyday interactions.”38 Fair equality of opportunity to public offices and positions and
the Difference Principle inform Mills’s principle of ending racial exploitation. Mills
defines racial exploitation as “racialized concentrations of wealth and poverty that tend to
perpetuate themselves inter-generationally.” 39 Lastly, Mills recognizes that Rawls’s
primary social good of self-respect can be extended to inform a nonideal principle of
ending racial disrespect. He defines racial disrespect as an “ontological stigmatization of
a group as inferior, lesser beings because of ‘racial membership.’” 40
Although Mills explicitly writes that Rawls’s POJ serve as a guide, it is unclear in
what order the two original positions are meant to occur. An obvious conclusion is that
Rawls’s original position is performed first, so that it can guide the construction of
nonideal proposals thereafter. However, given Mills’s criticism that the proposal of an
ideal society cannot be created without consideration of actual nonideal injustice, an
argument can be made that both original positions should occur simultaneously. This
will have to remain a problem to be resolved since Mills has never published a full
proposal for reforming Rawls.
Another problem with Mills’s proposal is that his principles are insufficient in
application to black women and the needs of other racially oppressed groups. It is not
clear how Mills’s principles address the inequality and disrespect of African-American
women qua women. Mills seems to commit an error, which black feminists have noted.
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In discussion of African-American justice by male writers, the particular experience and
needs of black women are often ignored. Issues of sexism, for example, are subsumed
under a discussion of racism.41 Additionally, other racial minorities may have claims of
rectification not embodied in Mills’s principles (e.g. respecting language and/or cultural
needs). It is unclear how Mills would address such concerns. Should a new original
position be constructed for every oppressed/marginalized racial group due rectificatory
justice?
Finally, Mills’s use of psychic social goods is limited. He includes in his last
principle the psychic social good of self-respect, but it does not address other psychic
social goods such as trust, empowerment, etc., which I argue are important, particularly
in the case of DACs.
A surprising feature of Mills’s proposal is that he only partially lifts the veil of
ignorance. Mills allows knowledge of the existing basic structure as racially unjust, but
maintains the representatives’ ignorance of their own and their group’s background
information. I assume this is for the sake of preventing bias and manipulation during
deliberation in the original position. However, fair deliberation does not necessitate
epistemological ignorance of existential circumstances.
Aside from the fact that no one can discard their existential history while
reflecting on their conception of justice,42 such history provides moral depth to the
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communitarians such as Michael Sandel. Rawls, in fact, denies that his theory is rooted in a
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performed by actual people in the world with actual existential histories. Rawls writes,” The veil
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individual’s understanding of justice. A communitarian critic of Rawls, Michael Sandel,
writes:
To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to
conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly
without character, without moral depth. For to have character is to know that I
move in a history I neither summon nor command, which carries consequences
nonetheless for my choices and conduct. It draws me closer to some and more
distant from others; it makes some aims more appropriate, others less so. As a
self-interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to
distance myself from it, but the distance is always precarious and provisional, the
point of reflection never finally secured outside the history itself. 43
One’s moral character and understanding of morality is shaped by the individual’s
history, according to Sandel. If he is correct, then self-knowledge, as well as full
knowledge of the socio-economic circumstances of representatives and their groups, is
important in the deliberation of the POJ.
Full knowledge of class, race and gender relations in the basic structure would
ideally make representatives in the original position more cognizant of the scope and
severity of injustice in the actual society. This possibly could affect deliberations such
that representatives would choose POJ or construct a nonideal theory that addresses the
wide range of past and present injustices in liberal states. For these reasons, I propose the
elimination of the veil of ignorance entirely.

not imply that the self is ontologically prior to the facts about persons that the parties are
excluded from knowing. We can, as it were, enter this position at any time simply by reasoning
for principles of justice in accordance with the enumerated restrictions on information. When, in
this way, we simulate being in the original position, our reasoning no more commits us to a
particular metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the self than our acting a part in a play.”
Rawls (1971), 27.
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The obvious response to eliminating the veil is to question how it can ensure that
representatives will not be biased and attempt to manipulate the deliberation process to
their group’s advantage, particularly when the representative and/or represented group
hold power in the actual society. This possibility is compounded by the fact that one of
the requirements of representatives in the original position is to argue for the best
principles for their particular group.
My response is that, theoretically within political liberalism, the veil of ignorance is
actually a secondary measure ensuring fair and cooperative deliberations and thus not
necessary. A precondition for being a representative in the original position is
understanding that persons are reasonable and open to hearing reasonable arguments,
even when they may conflict with a representative’s interest. Representatives are also
cooperative and willing to compromise. These characteristics are reflected in the two
moral powers representatives must possess, according to Rawls: a sense of justice and a
capacity for a conception of the good. The representative’s sense of justice compels him
or her to agree to and abide by fair terms of cooperation. The capacity for a conception
of the good not only allows representatives to form POJ that meet the best interest of their
group, but grants them the capacity to revise their conception of the good and revise
principles found to be unjust.
Given the moral character of representatives, they would not be compelled to use
social, economic or political advantage to manipulate the deliberation process in their
favor. Additionally, they would reject principles that have been sufficiently proven to be
unjust to other groups. Unless Rawls is pessimistic or skeptical of the capacity of his
representatives to exercise their moral powers and act according to liberal values, it is not
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apparent why the veil is necessary. Representatives should be able to deliberate with
complete knowledge of the socio-economic and political circumstances of all citizens and
choose the POJ without the veil of ignorance.
The elimination of the veil of ignorance, retention of the existing POJ as a guide
for nonideal theory, consideration of the effects of white supremacy, inclusion of psychic
social goods and, finally, consideration of African-American women and all marginalized
racial groups informs my proposition for a nonideal principle of corrective racial justice
in the following:
The rectification of racial injustice should satisfy the following conditions:
1. It should seek to cultivate psychic social goods and fairly distribute material
social goods,
2. It should seek to cultivate the harmed groups’ abilities to utilize basic rights,
liberties and opportunities within the context of specific cultural and gender
needs
3. It should foster mutual trust and respect between citizens within and outside
harmed groups, and between harmed groups and government
4. It should entail explicit recognition of past injustice based on white male
domination and the promotion of a critical historical narrative with white male
domination as its nexus.
The principle I propose has the benefit of addressing the variety of existential
effects stemming from racial injustice to different groups. Condition 2 considers cultural
differences and the needs of women. I address psychic social goods in Conditions 1 and
3. Condition 2 and its demand to cultivate the autonomy of racially disadvantaged
communities in terms of rights, liberties and opportunities serves to promote the psychic
social good of empowerment (personally and politically). Condition 3 aims to cultivate
the social goods of trust and respect. The use of the words “cultivate” rather than
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“distribute” recognizes the nontangible relational interaction needed to foster psychic
social goods.
The last condition is not only influenced by Mills but by sociologists Juan
Espindola and Moises Vaca’s article “The Problem of Historical Rectification for
Rawlsian Theory.”44 They argue that the acknowledgement of past wrongdoing and an
apology are necessary in cases where the government has subjected citizens to psychic
harm. It is necessary for the sake of repairing the self-respect of victims and for the
moral repair of the nation. Without a public proclamation of wrongdoing and an apology,
it is not clear that the government or the rest of society respects the victims as equal
citizens. Thus, they propose that rectificatory justice should be committed to the
following:
Ideal liberal justice requires ensuring the prerogatives of justice from the present
on and providing means for historical rectification—such as retribution,
compensation, and recognition-driven measures on behalf of victims of past
political violence, as well as the institutional promotion of a critical historical
narrative.45
Espindola and Vaca’s inclusion of recognition and the promotion of a critical
historical narrative are proposed in the context of Latin American countries subjected to a
recent history of dictatorship. However, such a proposal can be similarly applied to
groups subject to white supremacy who are victims of racial and gender violence as well
as economic exploitation, marginalization, etc. Furthermore, such a proposal is
consistent with Mills’s advocacy for the acknowledgement of white supremacy as part of
liberal theorization.
44
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Although the third principle is intended as a starting point to address a specific
type of injustice in nonideal theory, it is also consistent with being a part of ideal theory.
Espindola and Vaca write that addressing the injustice of actual nonideal societies is a
necessary condition to establishing a well-ordered society. This is consistent with Mills’s
statement that one cannot have a well-ordered society without addressing the history of
white supremacy. Since Rawls is concerned about the self-respect of citizens, mutual
respect between citizens and citizens’ commitment to liberal values, such concerns can
only be addressed by recognizing past harm on behalf of the state and the promotion of a
critical narrative of the nation’s history.
The principle I propose is not intended to be definitive. Given Rawls’s
concession that in light of past racial injustice and rectification, new principles may be
needed, I do not believe my proposal for a new principle of corrective racial justice is so
radical as to be un-Rawlsian. At most, Rawlsians may quibble over the language used in
my principle. I do not believe my elimination of the veil of ignorance is problematic,
since actual persons applying political liberalism would be aware of their existential
history. The requirement of impartiality pertains more to the character of representatives
rather than to an epistemological concern. Finally, because the principle demands
recognition of white supremacy as part of liberal theorization, and a comprehensive
rectification of the harms resulting from white supremacy, Mills’s concerns are
addressed. In that my proposal maintains the importance of Rawls’s POJ as guides to
doing nonideal theory, Shelby’s position is considered. The concern for protecting basic
rights and liberties and fair distribution of opportunities are all present in my principle.
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The principle I propose is meant to incorporate Rawls’s POJ and extend beyond them by
adding the recognition of white supremacy and the importance of psychic social goods.

86

Chapter 5
Racial Equality and the Limits of Liberalism
Introduction
In light of the social conditions of many black Americans, which I believe to be
vestiges of socially racist policies and practices (such as nationwide police brutality and
the murder of black males, the sizeable wealth gap between blacks and whites and the
continued lack of robust social relations between blacks and whites), the problem of
racial equality in respect to African Americans continues to be a relevant topic for social
and political philosophy. Sociologist Gunnar Myrdal famously concluded in his mid–
20th-century analysis of American race relations that the intractability of racism,
segregation and discrimination is not a problem resulting from American ideology. 1
Such social and political ills are antithetical to liberal values such as liberty and equality
for all on which the United States is founded. The persistence of racial inequality, he
argues, is due to a fault in the American will to actualize such ideals, rather than a flaw
within liberalism itself.2

1

See Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern
Democracy (London: Harper and Brothers Publishing, 1944). Although written in the midtwentieth century, Myrdal’s conclusion is indicative of many philosophers, social scientists and
politicians in terms of how they view liberal values. More recent challenges to Myrdal can be
found in and Jennifer L. Hochschild, The New American Dilemma: Liberal Democracy and
School Desegragation. (Stoughton: Yale University Press, 1984) and Derrick Bell, “Racial
Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Conditions” Notre Dame Law Review 52
(1976). As discussed respectively in sections four and five of this paper, both doubt the power of
liberal values to affect white American attitudes, beliefs and behavior concerning race.
2

Note that the term “liberalism” refers to the philosophical political theory which values
individual liberty, not the ideology of a political party.
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I argue that traditional liberalism can be criticized for failing to provide a feasible
theoretical framework to combat racial equality. 3 There are three flaws in traditional
liberalism that hinder racial equality and/or serve to support racial inequality. The first is
the absolute primacy placed on respecting the autonomy of persons. Absolutely
respecting autonomy allows citizens to hold false beliefs and prejudices and refuse to
substantially interact with racial groups outside of their own. This has social and political
ramifications in the form of residential segregation and leads to some citizens and
politicians being indifferent or hostile to the concerns of African Americans. The latter
particularly has bearing on what types of laws are passed, what policies are implemented
and how institutions function in relation to African-American communities. The second
flaw is liberal theorists’ tendency to constrain their work to ideal theory. Theorizing only
within the framework of ideal political structures and ideal citizens fails to fully address
the particular way institutions, cultures and individual actors contribute to racial
inequality and thus fails to sufficiently provide methods to combat racial inequality.
Lastly, correlated with the second flaw, the omission of white dominance as a feature of
liberalism marginalizes the plight of the oppressed and adds a further barrier to providing
practical solutions to combat racial inequality. I refer primarily to philosopher Charles
Mills’s criticisms of liberalism in support of the second and third claims. 4

3

“Traditional liberalism” refers to the canonical conception of liberalism which gives
primacy to individual liberties over other values. In various forms, the concept of liberty is found
in classical contract theorists such as Locke and Kant, but is most exemplified in the work of John
Stuart Mill and his Harm Principle which restricts government from interfering with the liberty of
citizens (except to prevent citizens harming each other.) See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1978).
4

See, for example, Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1997) and Charles Mill, “’Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” Hypatia 20 (2005): 165-184.
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In light of these flaws, I argue that traditional liberalism does not seem to have an
effective theoretical apparatus to combat anti-black sentiment or indifference, which
prevents the treatment of African Americans as full and equal citizens; thus, traditional
liberalism needs reform. I propose that the theoretical problems can be resolved by
adopting concepts from non-liberal and critical theories of race. A moderate liberal
perfectionism5 and its conception of autonomy is useful in providing justification for the
state to change the behaviors and attitudes of whites. Marxism and its methodological
feature of incorporating the actual historical conditions of society to inform political
philosophy can be used to address the problem of over-relying on ideal theory.
Ultimately, I contend that although the theoretical problems within liberalism can
be resolved, the measures that I propose do not resolve a fundamental metaphilosophical
problem within all liberal theories. Given the prevalence of anti-black sentiment, how
would any proposals for full racial equality ever gain enough support to be put into
practice? Fundamental to liberalism is the proposition that government acts on behalf of
the will of the people. If the majority of citizens do not wish to change the existing civil
society and economic and political structure for the sake of full racial equality, then
proposals for full racial equality have no practical use. In the last section, I discuss law
professor Derrick Bell’s “Racial Realism” in which he argues that racism is a permanent
feature of the social, economic and political structure of America such that full racial
equality for African Americans as a whole is not possible in the foreseeable future. If
Bell is correct, then liberalism is beyond reform in relation to racial justice for African

5

Briefly, I define moderate liberal perfectionism as the political theory in which state has
the duty to promote the autonomy of citizens, which can entail social engineering.
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Americans, and thus liberal theorists doing work in racial justice have a dilemma they
must grapple with.
This paper is constrained to racial equality in relation to African Americans and,
specifically, disadvantaged African-American communities.6 I assume aspects of my
argument can be applied to other racial and ethnic groups in their respective contexts.
Given my particular concern for disadvantaged African-American communities, a
fundamental assumption of this paper is that if liberal theorists are concerned with how to
revitalize disadvantaged African-American communities, substantial support must come
from whites. The prospect of African Americans fulfilling this task alone is not feasible
given the amount of economic and political resources it would require. Hence, there
needs to be substantial concern and support from the white majority or whites with
power. The question at hand in this paper is whether liberalism in practice can change
anti-black attitudes, beliefs and action, such that full racial equality becomes a reality.
Traditional Liberalism and the Ideal of Cooperation and Respect
A central concept of liberalism is the importance of social cooperation. Classic
social contract theorists such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argue that liberal
states are maintained and function effectively when all citizens abide by the agreement to
respect the laws of a government chosen by citizens.7 This requires social cooperation in
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“Disadvantaged African-American communities” refers to African-American
communities which entail residents who are isolated from mainstream society, unemployed or
underemployed, impoverished, and subjected to high crime rates and poor public services
(education and police enforcement for example.)
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Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987).
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that citizens must reciprocate obedience to the law in order for the law to have any
authority in regulating the behavior of citizens.
Contemporarily, in John Rawls’s reformulation of social contract theory for a
pluralistic liberal democracy, hypothetical representatives of citizens cooperate to
determine principles of justice used to form a liberal state. 8 Further cooperation among
citizens in the form of a consensus is required to justify Rawls’s principles of justice and
their resultant political structure.9 In order for such cooperative ventures to work
(whether it is in classic social contract theory or Rawls’s social contract theory), citizens
(and representatives of citizens, in the case of Rawls) are required to be equal in political
standing. This is for the sake of ensuring that the social contract is established on a fair
basis and that it is an accurate representation of the will of the citizens. Meeting these
two conditions helps justify why citizens should obey the state.
However, the scenario of the social contract in both its classic and contemporary
forms is highly idealized. It requires citizens to disregard differences in socio-economic
and political power, self-interest and irrational prejudices and biases, all of which could
taint the condition of equality needed to establish a fair social contract. One must be
willing to be impartial to a high degree for the sake of reaching a consensus. 10 Aside
from the argument that Rawls’s conception of citizens as rational agents is ontologically
8

See Rawls’s discussion of representatives in his hypothetical scenario of deliberation
“the original position.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971), 17-22.
9

See Rawls’s discussion of an overlapping consensus in which citizens deliberate on the
principles of justice. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993), 164-168.
10

See Rawls’s discussion of “reasonable citizens.” Reasonable citizens are those who
recognize the interests of others and are willing to compromise and cooperate with citizens whose
interests may conflict with one’s own. Ibid., 48-54.
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dubious,11 this model of regarding others impartially has never been fully realized in
practice in respect to African Americans. The historical enslavement, disenfranchisement
and oppression of African Americans has shown that, due to racism, prejudice and selfinterest, whites en masse have been unwilling to fully put aside (if not change) irrational
beliefs and attitudes that prohibit full cooperation with African Americans on fair terms.
Why has the ideal of robust cooperation not been actualized in respect to African
Americans? In order to cooperate with others on fair terms and maintain such an
arrangement over the long-term in a shared environment, respecting the other as worthy
of participating in such an arrangement is required. I contend that history shows that
whites did not respect African Americans as full persons and citizens, and thus did not
consider them worthy of social, economic and political cooperative parity with whites.
A review of African-American history shows that blacks historically have been
denied both the ontological status of being fully human and the political status of being
citizens, and have thus been denied respect in both categories. Aside from the obvious
lack of ontological and political respect given to slaves, in the 19th century, African
Americans as a whole were denied respect through various ethnologies and pseudoscience devised to argue for the inferiority of African peoples. After Emancipation, a
further display of whites’ lack of respect for African Americans is found through the
Black Codes and Jim Crow, which institutionalized racism in the South, and the
continued discrimination and segregation of blacks in the North. 12
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Contemporarily, in the civil and political spheres, evidence suggests that a lack of
respect and an unwillingness to engage in robust interaction and cooperation with blacks
continues. In the civil society of residential communities, places of social association,
and leisure activity, whites and blacks are largely separated. The majority of whites and
blacks live in predominately racially homogenous communities respective to race. 13
White and black children attend public schools predominately populated by their
respective races.14 A recent statistical analysis shows that three-quarters of white
Americans do not have any nonwhite friends. 15 A fact Martin Luther King, Jr. observed
in 1962 remains the case today: Christian places of worship are largely segregated. 16

Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America: Historical Discrimination, Modern
Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies,” Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law,
1996. Web. 14 June 2016. His analysis shows that there is a historical trend of institutional
residential discrimination that continues presently in new forms (e.g. institutions such as HUD
steering black clients into disadvantaged African-American communities.) Seitles concludes
“Segregation is the link to understanding the perpetuation of urban poverty in America and is
attributable to the present lack of affordable housing in safe and economically prosperous
suburban communities. The existence of isolated and racially segregated housing has preserved
racial mistrust, furthering ignorant stereotypes that inhibit our society from attaining true racial
equality.”
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There have been minor improvements in each of the examples mentioned, in addition to
increased presence of blacks in the workplace and interracial marriages. However, these
improvements are marginal and America remains racially divided, particularly in civil
society.17
There are other factors that contribute to residential and school segregation, such
as concerns about property value decreasing in neighborhoods with black residents and
about sending one’s children to dysfunctional public schools (which, in the case of urban
areas, disproportionately tend to be in African-American and Hispanic communities).
However, the existence of both phenomena exists due to individual prejudice and
institutional racial inequality. 18 Whites’ resistance to reside and educate their children
with blacks only further entrenches prejudice and racial inequality.

in America.” Martin Luther King, Jr., "An Address Before the National Press Club," A Testament
of Hope (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 101. See Michael Lipka, “Many U.S. Congregations
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Due to continued racial segregation, institutional or otherwise, many African
Americans believe that most whites do not respect or wish to associate with blacks.
Sociologists Leonard Steinhorn and Barbara Diggs-Brown conclude that this explains
black self-segregation. Black self-segregation is not largely due to prejudice on behalf of
blacks, but to distrust of and frustration with whites. They write that numerous studies
have shown that blacks actually prefer to live in well-integrated neighborhoods. In
contrast, studies show that when a sizable number of blacks move into white
neighborhoods, whites gradually leave. This rejection by whites, and other forms of
rejection, results in some blacks giving up on integrating. The authors write, “Nor are
whites the only ones exercising racial choice. Increasingly, blacks – tired of the incessant
daily reminders that they are black and not merely people – are viewing whites with
distrust and concluding that true integration is an unworkable and unrealistic ideal.” 19
Continuing, they note that blacks self-segregate as a form of protection from people who
only know how to interact with them in a race-conscious way.
In the political sphere, issues of institutional racism are a matter of daily news.
The Black Lives Matter movement specifically addresses the concern that police officers
do not respect African Americans (particularly black men) as human beings. This
premise is purported to explain why police officers mistreat and kill black men

Public Schools, 2013-2014 Civil Rights Data Collection Nationwide Student Demographics:
Newly Published Data. 2016. Web. 30 June 2016. The report finds there is a large racial disparity
in K-12 schools in terms of out-of-school suspensions and school expulsion of blacks in
comparison to whites. Black students are disproportionately referred to police and subjected to
police arrests. Black and Latino students have less access to high-level math and science courses.
Black and Latino students disproportionately attend schools with inexperienced teachers than
white students.
19
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disproportionately to other racial groups. The condition of disadvantaged AfricanAmerican communities serves as an example of how public institutions and the public at
large lack respect for particularly poor African Americans. A segment of the nation
views residents of disadvantaged African-American communities as lazy, unwilling to
work, leeching on government services and prone to violent and immoral behavior. 20
However, sociological data shows that most residents of disadvantaged communities
wish to be employed but there is an extreme dearth of jobs. Only a small percentage of
residents are responsible for the crime shown daily on the news in such communities.
Most residents share the same values as residents of other communities, but due to
poverty, high unemployment, poor public services and residential isolation from other
communities, their opportunities are severely limited and they are thus unable to better
their condition.21 Due to the negative perception of disadvantaged African-American
communities, the concerns of such communities are ignored and their residents are
perpetually subjected to extreme poverty, high unemployment, police brutality and poor
public services. Given this history, I contend that there is a prevailing negative attitude
regarding the social and political status of black people, particularly those living in
disadvantaged communities.
Considering the history of whites’ disrespect and unwillingness to cooperate with
African Americans, the question posed to the liberal theorist is: How can we get the
majority of white people to respect and want to work with black people? It has been
20
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established that respect and cooperation are conditions for a robust liberal state, with the
former being a precondition for the latter. Traditional liberal theorist Elizabeth Anderson
argues in The Imperative of Integration that African Americans are due both conditions
for the sake of a robust democracy.
Mutual regard signifies that the common purposes around which citizens are
joined have been constructed with due regard for each citizen’s interest. No
subgroup, not even a majority, is entitled to simply design a public policy that
ignores the interests of others and impose it by majority vote. Rather, in a fully
democratic culture, public purposes must be shaped by “mutual adaptation and
conciliation,” to different individual’s interests. This cannot happen without
“society and intercourse.” Citizens can adjust their sense of the common purpose
to others’ interests only through discussion and cooperative engagement with
other citizens from all walks of life on terms of equal regard. This is what
democratic culture consists in. Its site is civil society. It includes not only the
spaces recognized as “public forums” – such as public streets, parks, and
auditoriums-but all domains in which diverse citizens may interact and
cooperate.22
Racial segregation and inequality are antithetical to democracy, according to
Anderson. Additionally, she agrees that holding false beliefs and negative attitudes that
foster social isolation and estrangement from citizens is anti-liberal and anti-democratic.
However, traditional liberalism seems to be incapable of providing an effective means of
altering such beliefs and attitudes due to theoretical constraints.
The Problem of Autonomy in Respect to Racial Justice
One means of changing the behavior and beliefs of citizens is allowing the state to
use various forms of social engineering, such as coercion. However, a primary
theoretical barrier within traditional liberalism that prevents using such means is the
imperative that the autonomy of citizens is to be respected (except when a person
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explicitly seeks to harm others). This is embodied in John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle. 23
Thus, although the state has the duty to intervene when citizens unjustly discriminate
against others in the workplace or in education due to race, citizens have the right to hold
the belief that African Americans are inferior and should be discriminated against.
Furthermore, citizens have the right to act upon such beliefs in civil society in terms of
whom they associate with, worship with, spend leisure time with, etc. According to Mill,
the only permitted action for politicians and the general public is to reason with and/or
chastise people with illiberal and/or immoral ideas. No one has the right to coerce
individuals to change their beliefs and attitudes, even if it is for the individual’s good or
the social good.
Contemporarily, traditional liberal theorists concerned with racial equality have
not provided solutions beyond what Mill proposes. Elizabeth Anderson’s solution partly
involves more strongly enforcing existing anti-discriminatory laws, abolishing laws that
result in residential segregation (such as zoning regulations) and incentivizing African
Americans to move into nonblack middle-class neighborhoods (e.g. giving housing
vouchers). However, such proposals are consistent with Mill’s Harm Principle and do
not necessarily result in changing white attitudes and beliefs. Anderson acknowledges
that truly creating an integrated society in which blacks are treated and respected as
equals is dependent on the “spontaneous actions of citizens in civil society.” 24 Although
she admits that the current outlook is gloomy, she is optimistic that, slowly, through
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increased racial interaction among the younger generation and the election of Barack
Obama as president, race relations will improve. (It is notable that, ultimately, changing
the attitudes and beliefs in civil society is based on hope and not the efficacy of liberalism
itself.) Ultimately, her use of liberalism in The Imperative of Integration is simply
another attempt to use rational discourse and moral persuasion to change attitudes and
beliefs.
Liberal political theorist David Carroll Cochran, who argues for AfricanAmerican equality from the standpoint of respecting the group’s autonomy, does not fare
much better than Anderson. He argues that the continued segregation and discrimination
of African Americans infringes on the group’s ability to fully utilize autonomy to pursue
life goals. Because whites are the majority with power, they bear the greatest
responsibility to promote the autonomy of all citizens, according to Cochran.
Furthermore, as the cultural group responsible for and benefitting from the subordination
of African Americans, whites have a duty to better the condition of African Americans. 25
Similar to Anderson, Cochran proposes well-treaded political solutions to
improve the condition of African Americans, such as providing state support for black
institutions (banks, churches, etc.), promoting blacks to positions of power and equally
funding schools across districts. Cochran also recognizes the limits of state action and
the fact that, ultimately, change will rely on voluntary action within civil society. He
writes: “While the state can help create conditions more supportive of autonomy, it can
do so only in a partial way…This is why people, both black and white, concerned with
autonomy must also work within the institutions, practices, and meanings of civil society,
25
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themselves, without always turning to the state for help.” 26 Cochran is more optimistic
than Anderson and believes that despite cultural diversity, all Americans share core
liberal values that can be used to unite and combat persisting issues of race.
Cochran’s optimism in liberal values echoes Rawls. Rawls claims that most
citizens are “reasonable citizens.” Reasonable citizens share the same liberal political
values; thus, they would agree to his principles of justice because the principles reflect
shared liberal values.27 However, Cochran’s and Rawls’s faith in the power of liberal
values to motivate action and the reasonableness of people in making choices is dubious.
Such faith does not counter the claim that the majority of citizens may be motivated by
irrationality and self-interest over any “shared values.”
The liberal belief in the power of rational discourse, moral persuasion and
commitment to values presumes that citizens can easily overcome prejudice, self-interest
and ignorance. Given the historical oppression and continued subordination of African
Americans, it is reasonable to be skeptical about the efficacy of reason and morality on
behalf of whites as the dominant group. The challenge for liberalism is to provide an
effective means to combat citizens who use their autonomy to hold racist, prejudiced and
self-interested attitudes and beliefs that are harmful to the goal of racial equality.
Howard McGary similarly expresses skepticism about the efficacy of liberal values in
fostering respect, due to the primacy placed on autonomy.
Liberals can and do say that human beings should be accorded such things as
dignity and respect, and they believe that this entails taking a certain attitude or
26
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having dispositions towards others as well as acting or refraining from acting in
particular ways. So, it is not that they cannot account for the particular
estrangement that blacks experience because of the attitude of disrespect
generated by the dominant society, but that they don’t seem to have the theoretical
wherewithal to resolve the problem.
Since liberals assign great weight to individual liberty, they are reluctant to
interfere with actions that cause indirect harm. So even though they recognize
that living in a society that has an attitude of disrespect towards AfricanAmericans can constitute harm, and a harm caused by others, they are reluctant to
interfere with people’s private lives in order to eliminate these harms. 28
Continuing, McGary entertains that a national program educating whites may be a
solution, in addition to incentives and disincentives to make racism less profitable.
However, this requires the state to intentionally attempt to change the beliefs, attitudes
and actions of citizens, which infringes on Mill’s Harm Principle. Later, I propose that
such an infringement may be necessary in order to transform liberalism into a theory that
can provide practical means to achieve racial equality and better race relations.
The Problem of Ideal Theory in Respect to Racial Justice
Correlated with the problem of autonomy is the problem of traditional liberal
theorists over-relying on ideal theory to the detriment of nonideal theory. The origin of
conceiving citizens as ideal rational agents and the conception of liberal society as an
environment in which such citizens cooperate to maintain a just society can be traced to
the beginnings of social contract theory. Although Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau all recognize in their conceptions of the state of nature 29 that
humans can be motivated by irrationality and selfish self-interest, reason prevails with the
28
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establishment of the social contract, and selfish self-interest is superseded by enlightened
self-interest, in which citizens cooperate for mutual benefit.
Mill envisions social cooperation at its apex as a scenario in which citizens
engage in discourse with a plurality of views liberal and illiberal. Such discourse is a
manifestation of using autonomy at its highest level, according to Mill. Through public
discourse, the best and most virtuous positions win over the worst. Ultimately, the best
ideas prevail, which results in shaping public culture and persuading citizens to discard
illiberal and immoral attitudes and beliefs.
I am the last to undervalue the self-regarding virtues: they are only second in
importance, if even second, to the social. It is equally the business of education to
cultivate both. But even education works by conviction and persuasion as well as
by compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is
past, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated. Human beings owe to each
other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose
the former and avoid the latter. They should be forever stimulating each other to
increased exercise of their higher faculties and increased direction of their
feelings and aims toward wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading
objects and contemplations. But neither one person, nor any number of persons,
is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years that he shall not do
with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. 30
Even though government does not have the right to compel citizens to act
virtuously or discard prejudices and false beliefs, ideally vicious beliefs and attitudes
would be corrected through robust public discourse.
Contemporarily, Rawls similarly places a high value on public discourse in his
account of public reason. Reasonable people acknowledge that for the sake of the
common good they must consider the ends of other citizens (ends which may conflict
with their own, in some cases). In an ideal pluralistic liberal democratic polity, citizens
come together to discuss and deliberate about the principles of justice Rawls proposes
30
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and the resulting political structure. These ideal citizens put aside their comprehensive
views in favor of their political values.31 Upon reflection and discourse with other
reasonable citizens, each citizen discovers that he or she holds fundamental political
values he or she shares with other reasonable citizens. Ultimately, Rawls envisions a
consensus of support for his principles of justice because they are consistent with the
shared political values of reasonable citizens.
In both Mill’s and Rawls’s accounts, freedom of thought and association are
essential to effective social cooperation in an ideal liberal polity. However, both
scenarios are highly idealized. In actual, non-ideal public cultures such as the United
States, citizens en masse do not substantially engage in discourse with others outside their
group, due to geographic separation or prejudices against other groups due to race, class
or religion, for example.
Mill and Rawls are not oblivious to the fact that many people are guided by
irrational thinking. A prerequisite for participation in a liberal polity as an adult is that
citizens are properly educated as youths about liberal values, impartial reasoning and
respect for others as persons and citizens. If citizens are not able to put aside prejudices
and reason impartially, it is the fault of society, according to Mill. Mill writes, “If society
lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being
acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the
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consequences.”32 This may be true, but it is not entirely helpful in explaining how to
reform societies where this is the case.
Extending the problem of ideal theory to racial justice, philosopher Charles Mills
scathingly criticizes liberal theory and its use of ideal theory. The primary premise of his
argument is that liberalism, from its inception, is in essence a political theory for
privileged white men. Thus, the reliance on ideal theory, the model of the citizen as a
rational agent and the cooperative venture of the social contract are reflective of the
particular experiences and interests of privileged white men. In respect to ideal theory,
he writes:
Ideal theory, I would contend, is really an ideology, a distortional complex of
ideas, values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the nonrepresentative interests and
experiences of a small minority of the national population – middle-to-upper-class
white males-who are hugely over-represented in the professional philosophical
population.33
Continuing, he argues that the social contract is classically an agreement between
model white men. Nonwhites were not included as full members in the liberal state due
to the belief of their inferior ontological status as human beings. Only white men were
considered capable of being fully rational and thus capable of participating in the liberal
state as equal citizens. Mills notes that the two central philosophers in the liberal
tradition, John Locke and Immanuel Kant, limited or denied property rights, liberty and
personhood to nonwhites. Locke instituted slavery in his proposal for the 1669
Constitutions of Carolina, and Kant was one of the founders of scientific racism. 34 Even
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Mill, whose Harm Principle is intrinsically anti-paternalistic, did not believe the principle
applied to “barbarian” nonwhites, and thus he condoned the European colonization of
nonwhites.35
Mills argues that contemporary philosophers such as Rawls (who situates his
work exclusively in ideal theory) continue the tradition of racial exclusion indicative of
their liberal forefathers. Because ideal theory reflects the experience and interests of
privileged whites, it excludes or marginalizes the experience and interests of nonwhites
and thus fails to sufficiently address issues of race. In an ideal state, citizens are not
psychologically affected by a past history of oppression, subordination, poverty and
social isolation, and thus agents in the ideal state (of white men) can be conceived as
perfect rational agents who can ignore their existential circumstances. Every citizen is
politically equal in the ideal state, so issues of socio-economic political inequality do not
need to be substantially addressed. Finally, the majority of citizens in the ideal state are
not guided by prejudice, ignorance and false beliefs; therefore, there is no need to address
correcting the beliefs, attitudes and actions of citizens.
Extending Mills’s criticisms, his work reveals a third flaw with liberalism in
relation to racial equality. Due partly to the prioritization of ideal theory and the absence
of the experience and interests of nonwhites, Mills argues that liberal theory fails to
account for the impact of white supremacy in the theorization and application of political
philosophy.
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In an ideal liberal society, all citizens are political equals, so consideration of
group dominance is nonexistent. Theoretically, philosophers such as Rawls would claim
that such a concern is a matter of nonideal theory. In response, Mills claims that such a
methodological approach ignores the reality of liberal states as being founded on and
maintaining white male interests to the detriment of nonwhite interests. White
supremacy is not a secondary matter of concern in doing political theory. In
consideration that concepts such as the social contract, the rational agent and social
cooperation are actually raced concepts, Mills claims that white supremacy is intrinsic to
understanding and doing liberal political philosophy. Any discussion of liberalism
requires discussion of white supremacy. Mills states in the following that any discussion
of the social contract requires discussion of what he calls the “racial contract.”
The Racial Contract establishes a racial polity, a racial state, and a racial juridical
system, where the status of whites and nonwhites is clearly demarcated, whether
by law or custom. And the purpose of this state, by contrast with the neutral state
of classic contractarianism, is, inter alia, specifically to maintain and reproduce
this racial order, securing the privileges and advantages of the full white citizens
and maintaining the subordination of whites.36
Without their recognition of the racial contract inherent in liberalism, Mills claims
that liberal theorists perpetuate white supremacy. Thus if liberalism is to be reformed,
particularly for the sake of racial justice, it must specifically incorporate white supremacy
in its theorization. Essentially, if the liberal theorist does not accept the extent to which
white supremacy has affected the methodological approach of liberalism (e.g. the
primacy placed on autonomy, ideal theory, etc.) and its effects on theorizing about racial
justice, the theorist cannot effectively propose a framework that addresses changing antiblack attitudes, beliefs and actions.
36
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Reforming Traditional Liberalism in Respect to Racial Justice
In light of the failure of traditional liberalism to sufficiently provide a theory that
results in a practical solution to racial inequality, I contend that traditional liberalism
should be reformed if it is capable of resolving this dilemma. However, this requires
adopting concepts outside of the tradition, which some theorists may consider illiberal.
Philosopher Jennifer L. Hochschild, in The New American Dilemma, presents a
moderate perfectionist solution to racial equality. 37 Challenging the optimistic outlook of
the future of race relations found in Gunnar Myrdal’s The American Dilemma, she argues
that the belief that gradual changes in government policies will lead to racial equality is
unfounded. The intent of what she terms “incrementalism” (the method of making
gradual changes in policies) is to create change without creating political upheaval by
gaining public consensus through small changes. 38 However, Hochschild argues that
incrementalism only provides time for the status quo to reestablish itself in new forms,
rather than establishing new habits and patterns of behavior. She provides examples from
U.S. history. The gradual abolition of chattel slavery in the U.S. led to the spread of
slavery and its entrenchment in the 19th century. The attempt to gradually better the
condition of emancipated slaves during Reconstruction led to the establishment of Jim
Crow.
37
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In order to create effective changes in race relations that leads to racial equality,
Hochschild proposes that radical policies are needed that deliberately challenge antiblack prejudices and diminish the political, economic and emotional privileges whites
have as the dominant group. She does not advocate for a full upheaval of the state, but
proposes policies that would be unpopular with whites and considered illiberal. For
example, she proposes that until economic, political and social parity has been achieved
for African Americans, disproportionate resources, power and status should be given to
African Americans. She recognizes that such a proposal would have the effect of
harming poor whites in the short run and displacing wealthy whites in the long run.
Ideologically, she claims it would destroy the liberal ideal of equal opportunity prevalent
in American society and disrupt the existing class structure (which is dependent partly on
the oppression of African Americans 39). Additionally, she proposes that if racial equality
and white race privilege cannot be brought about voluntarily by whites, it should be the
case that whites allow elites to make radical changes necessary to disrupt the practices
and policies that maintain white privilege. Hochschild is aware that her proposals are
controversial, but maintains a modicum of optimism that such change is possible within
the existing political framework. American citizens just have to have the courage to
make the choice.
Although Hochschild does not identify herself as a perfectionist, her position is
consistent with a moderate form of perfectionism. If it is the case that citizens cannot or
will not change their beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that are immoral and prevent the
state from realizing its values, the perfectionist would claim it is the job of the legislator
39
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to implement laws that coerce (or force, in the case of a strong perfectionist) citizens to
change their beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. Her proposal would be considered by most
liberal theorists as illiberal because it involves the state purposefully attempting to affect
the choices of citizens, and undemocratic because politicians are allowed to pass laws the
majority may reject.
However, moderate liberal perfectionists such as Joseph Raz argue that such state
action is justified and does not harm but strengthens autonomy. Raz claims that
autonomy is only valuable when it is aimed at the good. The good includes acting
according to the moral and political values, a way of life liberals advocate. The state,
which provides the social and political structure in which citizens utilize autonomy, has
the duty to establish laws and policies that aid citizens in using their autonomy to pursue
the good.40 Thus, social engineering that serves the purpose of achieving racial equality
would be a duty of the state under Raz’s moderate liberal perfectionism in order to create
conditions for African Americans to fully use autonomy.
Additionally, liberal perfectionists argue that the claim reflective of the Harm
Principle that the liberal state should be neutral concerning the private affairs of citizens
has no validity. Philosopher Stephen Gardbaum, for example, argues that the idea of
liberal state neutrality is a myth. By definition as a political philosophy, liberalism
promotes values: liberal values. Liberty, equality, tolerance, respect for autonomy, etc.
are all values liberalism promotes. Gardbaum writes:
Within the terms of the contemporary debate, belief in the political promotion of
even the most traditional of liberal values, such as autonomy, equality, human
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dignity and tolerance, places one in the same nonliberal camp as beliefs in the
promotion of such different first order values as community and civic virtue. 41
I contend that liberal theorists should not be concerned with the mere fact that the
state promotes values. What should be of concern is which values are being promoted or
prioritized and how they harm or benefit citizens. As argued earlier, one problem is that
the prioritization of autonomy has been detrimental to other liberal values in relation to
African Americans, such as social cooperation and respect for people as persons and
citizens. Hence, what can be learned from Hochschild’s moderate perfectionist stance is
that the liberal thinker needs to reassess the prioritization of liberal values for the sake of
achieving racial equality and entertain the use of state coercive action for such goals.
This does not require engaging in fascist means of coercion, which clearly violates the
liberal commitment to liberty. I suspect such methods would be ineffective. The purpose
of this paper is not to argue for any specific ways of changing attitudes, beliefs and
behaviors, but liberal perfectionism allows incentivization as a tool of persuasion. For
example, reforming and allocating significant resources to inner-city public schools to
make them into high-quality schools and revitalizing the surrounding communities may
entice whites to reside and educate their children among blacks. (This would be
accompanied by policies that prevent gentrification.)
In relation to solving the liberal reliance on ideal theory, it may be useful for the
liberal to borrow a methodological approach indicative of Marxism. Although Marxism
is critical of liberalism, it is not necessarily antithetical. Liberal values such as liberty,
equality and tolerance are not antithetical to Marxism. Marxists merely claim that such
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values in existing liberal democratic states are utilized for the benefit of the ruling class at
the expense of the working class.42
The Marxist focus on the actual material conditions of class relations is a
methodological approach liberal theorists can use to temper the liberal reliance on ideal
theory.43 This includes consideration of the actual history of liberalism in practice
through white supremacy. A Marxist criticism of relying on ideal theory to the detriment
of nonideal theory is that it masks the actual material condition of exploitation and
oppression by capitalists. Despite the liberal advocacy of the equality and respect due
human beings, Marxists argue that historically, for the sake of exploiting African peoples
for the economic betterment of whites, such a status was not granted to African peoples.
Particularly, African-American chattel slavery was a case of oppressing people for the
sake of maintaining a group of unpaid workers to grow the American economy. After
Reconstruction, the oppression and exploitation of laborers continued in the form of low
pay, job discrimination, the demonization of blacks to prevent unionization with poor
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whites and the passing of laws to restrict black economic and political development for
the sake of capitalist interests.44
Contemporarily, some Marxists argue that continued subordination of African
Americans for the sake of capitalist interests is found in the large wealth gap between
blacks and whites as a whole and high unemployment/underemployment of blacks in
urban areas, for example. By keeping a group of citizens in poverty with low wages, it
keeps the wages of all workers lower than the maximum wages for jobs, thus increasing
profit for capitalists. Additionally, the continued social separation of races due to
prejudicial and racist beliefs continues to prevent class unity between races. 45
Hochschild summarizes the Marxist critique of liberalism in the following: “In
this view (Marxist), liberal democracy and racism in the United States are historically,
even inherently, reinforcing; American society as we know it exists only because of its
foundation in racially based slavery, and it thrives only because racial discrimination
continues. The apparent anomaly is an actual symbiosis.” 46 By inference, the Marxist
would argue that the “flaws” of liberalism that I discuss (the prioritization of autonomy,
reliance on ideal theory and the theoretical absence of white supremacy) are not flaws but
intentional features used to maintain racial inequality. Thus, the Marxist concludes that
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racial equality is possible only by eliminating capitalism and its ruling class ideology of
liberalism.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether traditional liberalism can be
reformed to sufficiently address actual issues of racial equality. Therefore, I have saved
for the last section the proposition that if it cannot, discarding liberalism may be a viable
choice. Additionally, I agree with critics of Marxism that class alone does not
sufficiently explain the history of racial equality pertaining to African Americans. The
impact of racism has its own effect in the social-political history of African Americans
that Marxism does not seem to capture in its class analysis. 47 Philosopher Sidney
Wilhelm, for example, points out that Marxism cannot account for the contemporary state
of mass unemployment in disadvantaged African-American communities. Such
communities, she states, are no longer part of any class but are declassed and thus
inconsequential to capitalists.48 I do not disregard the relevance of class relations on the
African-American experience; I merely maintain that it is only one relevant factor.
Marxism’s requirement that the actual material conditions of groups be a focal
point of doing political philosophy can be used by the liberal to assess the commitment to
autonomy and the use of ideal theory in relation to racial justice. Liberal philosophers
should strongly consider whether these commitments have the adverse effects claimed by
critics and, if so, consider what changes are needed regarding actual material conditions.
Additionally, taking into account the history of liberal states, liberals would have to
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consider the attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of whites and white supremacy as factors in
doing political philosophy. Theoretically, such changes would serve to create a balance
between work in ideal and nonideal theory in liberalism.
Derrick Bell and a Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Liberal Theorists
Although my proposals for using a moderate liberal perfectionism and
incorporating the actual material conditions of people within liberal theory resolves the
theoretical problems of autonomy and ideal abstraction within traditional liberalism,
these solutions do not resolve the fundamental metaphilosophical problem of traditional
liberal theory being ineffective in practice concerning full racial equality. Even if one
accepts that state coercion is justifiable and would be effective in changing anti-black
attitudes, beliefs and behaviors, the implementation of such a proposal into actual policy
presumes a change in the attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of the general public and/or
policy makers.
If the data presented earlier concerning race relations is taken seriously in
conjunction with the Hochschild and Marxist argument that racism is embedded in the
structure of liberal states, why should anyone expect any viable proposals for racial
equality to ever be implemented in actual policy?
This presents a serious dilemma for liberal theorists committed to doing work on
racial justice. One solution is to abandon liberalism altogether in favor of strong liberal
perfectionism. Amending Hochschild’s proposal that citizens elect elites committed to
racial justice to institute perfectionist polices for the sake of racial justice, a strong
perfectionism would allow such elites to forego public support and overthrow the existing
government. After a successful revolution, such elites would have the power to
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implement policies aimed at racial justice. Marxists may find such a proposal appealing;
however, the justification of government based on public consensus is fundamental to
liberalism and thus would be unappealing to most liberal political theorists. I suspect
many would view such a proposal as coming too close to fascism.
If a theorist is not willing to give up liberalism, an alternative is to give up on the
goal of achieving full racial equality. This is the solution proposed by law professor
Derrick Bell. Bell argues that racism is embedded in American society and political
institutions such that it is a permanent feature of the foreseeable future. This is central to
his theory of Racial Realism, which requires acceptance of the idea that American social,
economic and political practices and institutions serve the interests of whites. 49 Moving
away from the class analysis of Marxism to critical race analysis, Bell argues that whites
deny blacks full rights in order to serve the interest of maintaining white dominance, in
addition to acting on their conscious or unconscious nationalistic belief that America is a
white nation and white dominance is natural. This results in primacy given to white
interests in government policy over the interests of African Americans. In some cases,
government policies directly harm African Americans for the sake of white interests (e.g.
Jim Crow), and policies apparently aimed at improving the condition of African
Americans ultimately serve white interests.
Bell supports his claims through a historical analysis of racial policies in the
United States. He argues that every major policy in the United States aimed to help
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African Americans was for white interests. For example, Emancipation ultimately served
to displace economic power in the south, allowing northern capitalist expansion.
Desegregationist policies in the 20th century served, in their genesis, to combat the
international image propagated by Russia that America was hypocritical in its espousal of
democracy and liberal values.
Contemporarily, Bell assesses that the goal of integration is a myth; he provides
evidence showing that the majority of whites prefer to be segregated from blacks. Based
on statistical data, only a small percentage of workplaces, schools and neighborhoods are
substantially integrated. When the percentage of African Americans in these spheres of
society reaches above 25%, opposition from whites appears with the claim that it is not
“integration” but “changing” neighborhoods, schools and workplaces. 50
Bell recognizes that, individually, some blacks can succeed under such social and
political conditions, but it is not the case the African Americans en masse can do so. He
concludes that because of prevailing prejudicial and racist attitudes and beliefs, and the
self-interest of whites in maintaining power, racism is permanent in America in the
foreseeable future. The best African Americans and activists for racial equality can do is
to continue fighting for equal rights in order to maintain existing rights, while being
cognizant that blacks will not obtain full racial equality.
Bell presents a very bleak outlook on racial equality for African Americans.
Some may immediately ask, “Well, doesn’t the election of Obama as president show
progress and serve as an indicator of hope?” Bell passed away two years after the
election of Obama and did not provide commentary on Obama’s election. Philosopher
50
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Bill Lawson surmises that Bell would judge Obama’s election as only a symbolic gesture
of racial equality. Lawson argues that some white attitudes toward Obama shown
through questioning Obama’s birthplace, religious affiliation and educational
background, in addition to racist references to him as the “food stamp president,” suggest
that President Obama is not respected by a large segment of society as a full citizen.
Lawson writes,
White attitudes toward Obama do not seem to support the position that he is seen
as a full member of the moral community or the state. We have not overcome. If
the racial climate is bad for Obama, the climate for the rest of the black
community must be worse. Indeed, the situation is not bright for the rest of the
black community.”51
Lawson continues by providing statistical evidence of racial inequality, such as
the disproportionately high unemployment rate among African Americans and the
prevention of passing public policies that would improve the plight of some African
Americans. In earlier articles, Lawson is more optimistic, similar to Anderson and
Cochran, that whites may be capable of social change with regard to racial equality. 52 In
recent works, influenced by Bell, he is more skeptical and ends an article on racial
equality with a quote from Humphrey Bogart in Key Largo: “I had hopes once, but I gave
them up.”53
Although Bell’s Racial Realism allows the liberal to continue pursuing racial
justice in a limited form, the defeatism inherent in it is discomforting at best and
demoralizing at worst. It is reasonable to think that believing in Racial Realism could
51
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result in a liberal theorist abandoning liberalism and/or abandoning the pursuit of racial
equality for African Americans altogether. What is the point of doing work for the sake
of realizing racial equality if the end goal is impossible to achieve? One response is to
pursue such work for the sake of justice itself, even though a full realization of justice is
impossible. This is a noble response, but it cannot reasonably be expected to motivate
the average liberal theorist, activist or politician concerned with racial justice for African
Americans. Even Martin Luther King, Jr., who recognized that he would not live to see
the “promised land” of racial equality and harmony, had hope that it would occur in the
foreseeable future. It takes an extraordinary person to pursue a goal without hope of it
being achievable. For most, I assume accepting Bell’s position would result in some
combination of disillusionment, apathy, anger and a turn to theories that call for the
upheaval of the existing social, political and economic structure.
Bell, however, believes that his position does not have to lead to despair; in fact,
he argues that acceptance of Racial Realism is psychologically beneficial. Lawson reads
Bell as arguing that accepting full racial equality as unobtainable is actually
psychologically better than having hope in an unrealizable goal. Lawson writes, “This
‘more’ realistic view is psychologically healthier than believing in something that is not
validated by our experiences. Once the healthy person realizes that some state of affairs
will not materialize, they change their understanding of what is possible and how they
should behave.”54
From Lawson’s analysis and Bell’s writings, I see the claim that one should not
despair as being for two reasons: 1) It is psychologically healthier for the individual to
accept reality rather than an illusion, and 2) for the sake of pursuing racial justice, it is
54
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practically better to base social activism on the reality of social circumstances rather than
on a misguided ideal. Bell’s conception of “psychologically healthier” needs elaboration.
If he equates psychological health with a psychological state of happiness or peace, it
does not follow that Racial Realism necessarily provides either of these states. Knowing
and accepting the “truth” has merit in terms of character and practical use, but as I argued
earlier, it possibly could result in anger or apathy. Furthermore, holding on to an illusion
can make one psychologically happier than the truth can, in some cases. An argument
that people who believe in an afterlife or deity (which may be illusory beliefs) are
psychologically less happy or incapable of being happier than people who are atheists is
dubious.
Bell’s second point only leads back to my initial problem: If it is the case that
liberalism is intrinsically tied to racism and full racial equality is not possible, why
continue to be a liberal theorist in respect to pursuing racial equality? Why not become a
Marxist, communitarian, etc.?
I do not have a resolution to this dilemma. The purpose of this paper it to display
a problem I and other liberal thinkers concerned with racial equality for African
Americans have to contend with. Even though I discuss this issue within a black/white
racial dichotomy, my argument may be relevant to theorists who do work in racial justice
for other racial or ethnic groups as well. If liberal theorists accept the view that the
majority of whites will never voluntarily be agents for change in relation to full racial
equality, and that rational discourse and moral persuasion are ineffective means to change
attitudes, beliefs and behaviors in relation to race, the result I have argued is skepticism
of relying on liberalism as a theory conducive to racial equality. For those who are
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unconvinced, rather than refuting my argument from the basis of liberal theory, I call for
empirical evidence that whites en masse are capable of being agents of racial equality in
respect to African Americans. Mere hope is insufficient.
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